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It would be nice if we could just assign jobs, one student per firm. 
It would make it a lot easier.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 By the fall of the second year of law school, the vast majority of 
law students at top schools have entered a process that will deter-
mine their initial career assignments.2 For the upper end of the mar-
ket, this involves interviewing at elite law firms for summer associ-
ate positions.3 During the recruiting process, firms expend substan-
                                                                                                                      
 1. Mark Jannot, Pick Me: Recruiting Madness, Illustrated, JD JUNGLE, Nov./Dec. 
2002, at 48, 51 (quoting Wendy Siegel, Associate Director of Recruitment, New York Uni-
versity School of Law and omitting comments of Mark Jannot). 
 2. See Wendy L. Werner, Radical Changes Make the Market Hard to Decipher: Re-
vamped Salaries and Billing, Still Untested, Make for an Apples-and-Oranges Situation, 
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 2000, at C12 (noting that large law firms take approximately fifty-five 
percent of graduating law students). 
 3. In this Article we use elite and large as substitutes, although we recognize that 
there are elite boutique firms which are smaller in size. See Robert M. Sauer, Job Mobility 
and the Market for Lawyers, 106 J. POL. ECON. 147, 150 (1998). 
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tial resources to narrow a large pool of law students to a few poten-
tial candidates to whom they extend offers.4 The war to attract this 
talent results in stiff competition. We argue, first, that much of this 
war can be usefully characterized as risk-averse firm behavior in re-
sponse to market-imposed uncertainty; and second, that this market 
structure is itself caused by the industrial organization of the elite 
law firm and the market for elite legal services. 
 Consider several related puzzles. In 2002-2003, at Harvard Law 
School, 730 employers conducted on-campus interviews to offer 
summer associate positions to a second-year class of around 550 stu-
dents.5 Since the very top firms will hire multiple law students, a 
substantial number of firms are expending significant resources 
without success. Why do some firms play the game when they are 
likely to strike out?  
 At our own law school, as at many others, firms are not allowed to 
pick who they will interview, or prescreen the resumes: if a student 
with a GPA below the firm’s cut-off wishes to interview, the firm 
cannot prohibit him or her from wasting its time. Prestigious law 
firms will travel from cities some distance away, at a considerable 
expense, to spend one or two days of partner time interviewing forty 
students for twenty to thirty minutes each, despite the fact that in-
terviews are notoriously poor indicators of future success.6 Not only 
do interviews provide little real information, but the objective meas-
ures of student performance are a fraction of what they might be. 
Firms are making hiring decisions on the basis of first-year grades, 
arguably only one-third of the potential information on law school 
performance. These are examples of how the market provides less in-
formation than is potentially available. Why do firms not wait until 
the third year to recruit when more information is available?  
 Even if a firm is fortunate enough to catch a Harvard student for 
a summer associate position, the chance of that student remaining 
with the firm through partnership is declining significantly.7 A 1998 
study of 154 law firms showed that, of the classes from 1988 through 
1996, nearly 10% of those recruited through the process had left the 
firm within a year, 43% had left within three years, and 66% had left 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See Werner, supra note 2 (“The cost of interviewing . . . is enormous.”). 
 5. Interview 3 (see infra note 25 and accompanying text for a description of these 
sources). 
 6. ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES 138 (1985) (arguing that interviews are a 
poor predictor of future performance); cf. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and 
Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1804-05 (2003) (explaining that 
employers can easily screen for similarity in interviews). 
 7. See Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfac-
tion, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 
239, 283 n.272 (2000). 
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within five years.8 This attrition rate has increased substantially 
from an earlier study of the classes of 1971 through 1976, which 
showed 45% to 51% leaving before partnership.9 These statistics are 
particularly troubling given that most firms lose money on associates 
for the first two to three years, because of training costs and more in-
tensive supervision.10 Attrition is a multiplier of the initial costs—an 
attorney who leaves after a year has not only cost the firm a substan-
tial amount of money in recruiting and training, but hurts external 
reputation and internal morale, and puts the firm back into the mar-
ket for an entry-level associate.11 Rising attrition rates mean that 
there are an increasing number of lateral associates in the market.12 
That fact leads to another question: Why does no large firm special-
ize in laterals, who have by definition already undergone training at 
another firm?13 
 This Article seeks to answer these and other questions concerning 
the market for lawyers. It does so on the basis of an empirical study 
of law firm recruiting in Chicago, one of the most well-studied legal 
markets in the country. Despite fairly ample inquiry into the struc-
ture and functioning of large law firms, very few scholars of the legal 
profession have paid much attention to the process of recruiting law-
yers from law schools.14 To gain a better picture of the market, we so-
                                                                                                                      
 8. TASK FORCE ON PROF’L CHALLENGES & FAMILY NEEDS, BOSTON BAR ASS’N, 
FACING THE GRAIL: CONFRONTING THE COST OF WORK-FAMILY IMBALANCE (1999) [hereinaf-
ter FACING THE GRAIL], http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/workfamilychallenges.htm (last up-
dated Dec. 3, 2003) (citing NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC., KEEPING 
THE KEEPERS: STRATEGIES FOR ASSOCIATE RETENTION IN TIMES OF ATTRITION: A BEST 
PRACTICES NATIONAL RESEARCH STUDY ON LAWYER CAREERS 53 (1998)). 
 9. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE LARGE LAW FIRM 137 (1988). 
 10. FACING THE GRAIL, supra note 8 (“[d]uring his or her third or fourth year, the as-
sociate (who if still at the firm) begins to ‘break even’ and become profitable for the firm.”); 
see also Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Balanced Hours: Effective Part-Time 
Policies for Washington Law Firms: The Project for Attorney Retention, 8 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 357, 367 (2002) (explaining that law firms do not make money on new associ-
ates until the third or fourth year). For a painstaking cost breakdown of new associate 
profitability (albeit one which admittedly is on the Greedy Associates message boards and 
thus may not be reliable), see Peter Jennings, Profitability of New Associates, at 
http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=001vrL (Nov. 12, 2002). 
 11. See Fortney, supra note 7, at 284; see also Williams & Calvert, supra note 10, at 
366 (estimating the cost of replacing a second-year associate at $200,000 to $500,000). 
 12. Some attribute rising attrition to enhanced job mobility, caused in part by the 
high-tech boom of the 1990s. See generally John P. Heinz et al., The Scale of Justice: Ob-
servations on the Transformation of Urban Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 337, 352-53 
(2001) (focusing on rising salaries and mobility). 
 13. See infra note 33. 
 14. But see NELSON, supra note 9, at 136-44; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in 
the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998) [hereinafter 
Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving]; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So 
Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
493 (1996) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gulati, Black Lawyers]. 
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licited interviews with hiring partners at the thirty largest law firms 
in Chicago, measured by number of attorneys in the Chicago office, 
along with professional recruiting coordinators, career services offi-
cers, and others involved in the process. We use these to construct a 
snapshot of the market as it existed in 2003 and suggest how it may 
be changing in response to market forces. 
 The Article is organized as follows. Part II describes the relevant 
actors and procedures at both law schools and law firms regarding 
recruiting and hiring, in the hope of filling a previously unfilled gap 
in the literature on law schools, law firms, and the legal profession. 
It describes a process that is noticeably costly and time-consuming, 
and is perceived as such by market participants. 
 Part III tries to explain the market at the level of the firm. First, 
in Part III.A, we explain firm behavior as a function of the market’s 
structure. Part III.A.1 identifies three particular sources of firm-level 
inefficiency, each related to lack of information and uncertainty. 
First, firms are forced to make hiring decisions with limited informa-
tion. The primary source of new data is first-year law school grades, 
which constitute a fraction of potentially available information that 
is produced before the student is hired at the end of three years. Sec-
ond, firms incur substantial training costs by hiring law students 
rather than laterals, since law students do not produce positive cash 
flow for two to three years after hiring.15 Third, the interviewing 
process is highly redundant, with both students and firms spending 
much time and energy talking with interlocutors they will not work 
with. 
 Part III.A.2 explains how each of those inefficiencies can be linked 
to the structure of the market. Law firm hiring is an example of a 
two-sided matching problem, a common feature of labor markets. 
Two-sided refers to the fact that agents are in two distinct sets: law 
firms and students, for example. Matching refers to the fact that both 
agents seek to match with each other.16 In contrast with certain other 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See sources cited supra note 10.  
 16. See C. NICHOLAS MCKINNEY ET AL., THE COLLAPSE OF A MEDICAL LABOR 
CLEARINGHOUSE (AND WHY SUCH FAILURES ARE RARE) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9467, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9467; Christo-
pher Avery et al., The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793 
(2001); John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Mar-
kets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment, 115 Q.J. ECON. 201 
(2000); Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Re-
lated to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 992 (1994) [hereinafter 
Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun]; Alvin E. Roth, New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in 
Market Organization, 250 SCI. 1524 (1990) [hereinafter Roth, New Physicians]; Alvin E. 
Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized 
Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists, 105 J. POL. ECON. 284 (1997); Alvin E. 
Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study 
in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991 (1984) [hereinafter Roth, Evolution]. For a broader 
914  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:909 
 
matching markets (notably the market for medical residents), the 
market for law firm associates is decentralized, meaning that there is 
no mechanism to coordinate the participants in the market.17 This 
creates the uncertainty that leads to the inefficiencies described. 
 Part III.B considers why the market is decentralized rather than 
centralized. Part III.B.1 looks at a similar market that, for a time, 
centralized and in part remains so today: the market for new lawyers 
in parts of Canada. Part III.B.2 considers some reasons why the 
United States market for elite law firm associates has remained de-
centralized. Part IV concludes. 
 This Article addresses a number of different literatures. Most ob-
viously, it is an addition to the rich literature on the management 
and structure of the large law firm.18 It does so by furthering the em-
pirical study of the Chicago legal community, perhaps the best-
studied legal services market in the United States.19 In addition, by 
focusing on entry-level recruiting, it ties into the empirical literature 
on professions and their relation to its educational apparatus.20 It 
also tracks the development of two new professions: professional re-
cruiting coordinators at law firms and professional career services of-
ficers at law schools. Finally, by examining recruiting in a particular 
                                                                                                                      
bibliography of topics covered, see ALVIN E. ROTH, DEP’T OF ECON., HARVARD UNIV., AL 
ROTH’S GAME THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS PAGE, at http://www.economics.harvard. 
edu/~aroth/alroth.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2004). 
 17. Note that the scale of the market alone cannot explain the different structure of 
the matching process. The National Resident Matching Program matched nearly 24,000 
applicants in 2003. Press Release, National Resident Matching Program, Record Number 
of Residency Positions Offered and Filled in 2003 Match (Mar. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/matchday03.pdf. It encompasses more than ninety-two 
percent of graduating seniors from medical school. See NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PRO-
GRAM, WHY THE MATCH? (2003), at http://www.nrmp.org/whythematch.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2004). By contrast, the total graduating classes of the top fifty law schools in the 
United States totaled 13,043 for the 2001-2002 school year. This figure was derived first by 
taking the top fifty law schools as determined by the 2004 U.S. News & World Report law 
rankings. America’s Best Graduate Schools 2004: Law Rankings, Tools, and Articles, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. [hereinafter Law Rankings], http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/ 
grad/rankings/law/lawindex_brief.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). The figures “indicate[] the 
total number of J.D. degrees awarded during the 2001-2002 academic year” for these top 
fifty law schools combined. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL & THE AM. BAR ASS’N, 
ABA•LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 75 (Wendy Margolis et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 18. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); MARC GALANTER & THOMAS 
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); 
NELSON, supra note 9; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corpo-
rate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1988); 
Wilkins & Gulati, Black Lawyers, supra note 14; Kevin A. Kordana, Note, Law Firms and 
Associate Careers: Tournament Theory Versus the Production-Imperative Model, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1907 (1995). 
 19. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (rev. ed. 1994). 
 20. See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISON OF 
EXPERT LABOR (1988). 
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market for professional services, it contributes to the literature on 
matching markets, developed most notably by Alvin Roth.21 In par-
ticular, the empirical study helps us understand the conditions under 
which a decentralized matching market will remain decentralized (or 
conversely, why a centralized matching market will centralize), a 
question not directly addressed in this literature to date. 
II.   THE MARKET: ACTORS AND PROCESSES 
 This Section describes the market for entry-level associates 
through the eyes of large law firm hiring partners and others closely 
involved in the process. The data was primarily gathered in Chicago, 
one of the largest markets for legal services in the United States. We 
chose Chicago as a market that has been particularly well studied 
and is large enough to provide general insight into market dynam-
ics.22 Some caution should be used, however, when drawing conclu-
sions from our findings for other legal services markets—larger mar-
kets such as New York have different equilibria in certain respects.23 
 We first identified the largest thirty firms in Chicago, as deter-
mined by number of lawyers.24 We then contacted the firm to identify 
the hiring partner. Interviews were conducted in random order, 
rather than proceeding from the largest to smallest firms. Our inter-
views consisted of sessions between thirty and sixty minutes. Some of 
the interviews were recorded, though in certain cases discovery con-
cerns led firms to deny our request to record the interviews. The ma-
jority of the interviews were conducted in person, though schedules 
of some partners and the physical location of others required us to 
conduct some interviews by phone. In total we talked with twenty-
three hiring partners out of thirty targeted. In addition to hiring 
partners, we interviewed approximately ten recruiting coordinators 
and on-campus placement directors. All interviews below are with 
hiring partners unless noted in parentheses after the interview.25 
                                                                                                                      
 21. See sources cited supra note 16. 
 22. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 19; NELSON, supra note 9; David B. Wilkins, 
Rollin’ on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Paradox, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
527, 544 (2000) (analyzing preliminary empirical research on black lawyers in Chicago). 
None of these authors, however, focus on the recruiting process. 
 23. For example, the ratio of callback interviews to offers for a summer associate posi-
tion. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, PERSPECTIVES ON FALL 2002 LAW STUDENT 
RECRUITING 13 (2003) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES], available at http://www.nalp.org/nalpresearch/ 
fall2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
 24. As reported in Crain’s Chicago Business, the business weekly of Chicago, based on 
the number of attorneys as of Aug. 1, 2002. Katrina Fenrick & Marie Pospichal, Crain’s 
List: Chicago’s Largest Law Firms, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Sept. 30, 2002, at 19. 
 25. To preserve anonymity, these interviews have been cited for the appropriate in-
formation in a general manner. Further inquiries about the interviews, methodology em-
ployed, and data gathered should be directed to the author. 
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A.   Actors 
 There are several sets of actors who participate in the market for 
law firm hiring. Most obviously there are the student interviewees 
and the law firm hiring committees. In addition, there are two new 
professions that have grown up in recent decades around recruiting: 
the law firm recruiting coordinator and the dean or director of career 
services at the law school. These new professions mediate between 
the two main sets of actors, the students and the lawyers who make 
hiring decisions. 
1.   The Candidates 
 Law students seeking an elite firm job usually begin the process 
by interviewing no later than the fall of their second year for summer 
positions that follow their second year.26 For some students, the proc-
ess begins earlier. Firms do hire students for the summer after their 
first year, but this is viewed as risky because it may not lead to per-
manent employment. This is because 1Ls will usually work at an-
other firm during their 2L summer. One typical firm reported hiring 
a 1L from Harvard who “took the credential [of having worked at the 
firm] and ran.”27 Since 1L summer associates cost the firms the same 
as the 2Ls—roughly $40,000 to $50,000 when salary, secretarial 
time, and the recruiting coordinator’s time are taken into account—
firms want to ensure that the person is likely to stay.28 To try to keep 
students who have worked the first summer, firms may require the 
student to return at the end of the 2L summer for two to three 
weeks.29  
 Sometimes, however, firms view hiring 1Ls as serving a market-
ing function.30 Firms recognize that law students do not have much 
information to distinguish reputations of different firms and draw a 
good deal of information from other students who have worked at the 
firm. A 1L who returns to campus with a positive report on her 
summer experience can positively influence the general perception of 
                                                                                                                      
 26. First-year law students are termed 1Ls, second-years 2Ls, and third-years 3Ls. 
Some schools have on-campus recruiting programs for 1Ls, held during the spring of the 
first year. These programs are much smaller than the 2L programs. For example, at Har-
vard the program attracts thirty to thirty-five firms compared with the 730 employers that 
attend the 2L on-campus interviewing (OCI) program. Personal conversation between one 
of the authors and Mark Weber, Assistant Dean for Career Services, Harvard University.  
 27. Interview 22. 
 28. Interview 14; Interview 27. For figures on the cost of summer programs, see 
NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC., THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUMMER 
PROGRAMS: LAW STUDENTS AND LEGAL EMPLOYERS REPORT 89 (2003) [hereinafter 
SIGNIFICANCE]. 
 29. Interview 29 (“We like to think . . . they’ll pick us because [we are] freshest in 
their minds.”). 
 30. Interview 8. 
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the firm the following fall. Three Chicago firms reported hiring 1Ls 
from Harvard and Stanford—nonregional but elite schools—for just 
this reason.31  
 Third-year law students and law clerks are another source of en-
try-level talent. As a group, 3Ls are perceived as being somewhat 
risky, in the sense that it is not always clear why the person did not 
work or was not given an offer after the 2L summer. Law clerks, on 
the other hand, are highly desirable candidates, with prestigious 
clerkships being rewarded with large bonuses upon joining the firm. 
 In addition, it is important to recognize that law students are not 
the only source of legal talent. Laterals are a substitute for students 
and have particular advantages. They are pretrained to a certain de-
gree. At least one of the firms we interviewed reported having con-
sidered seriously the possibility of hiring only laterals.32 Yet ulti-
mately no large Chicago firm has adopted this strategy (though at 
least one smaller Chicago firm has done so).33 We return to the puz-
zle of why few firms specialize in laterals later in this Article.34 
 For these reasons, the primary focus of recruiting activity is on 
2Ls. The most desirable candidates will have good grades from the 
first year, will have been accepted onto the law review, and will dem-
onstrate a genuine interest in working for a large firm. They will also 
meet the ubiquitous but ambiguous requirement of fit. Fit is the 
quality for which interviewers select, since most of the other deter-
minants can be gleaned from the paper record.  
2.   The Law Firms: Committees and Their Chairs 
(a)   Hiring Committee Composition 
 Law firms devote substantial resources to hiring. All firms we 
sampled have a hiring committee, usually but not always consisting 
of a mix of partners and associates, averaging 10.4 committee mem-
bers per firm. Some firms explicitly strive for diverse representation 
                                                                                                                      
 31. Interview 8; Interview 16; Interview 22. 
 32. Interview 21; 
A couple years ago, we considered going only for laterals. But our success rate 
for summer associates exceeds that of laterals. Laterals can be naïve regarding 
the market and their expectations. Also, sometimes there are perfectly good 
reasons to change jobs, but just as often there are some issues. The best later-
als are those associates that are referred to us by other associates. 
Id. Note how the comment suggests the need to stay in the market for associates. 
 33. See, for example, the Web site of Grippo & Elden, a thirty-seven-lawyer firm in 
Chicago: “since we hire most attorneys laterally, we do not have the expense of recruiting 
and training attorneys out of law school (nor do we have the stop-and-start inefficiency of 
bringing new associates and summer associates up to speed each June to gain traction on 
ongoing matters).” GRIPPO & ELDEN, LLC, ABOUT US, at http://www.grippoelden.com/ 
about.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
 34. See infra Parts III.A.1.(b), III.A.2.(c). 
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on these committees.35 There is no uniform voting procedure: some 
committees operate by consensus while others take decisions by ma-
jority vote.36 Firms also have at least one full time professional re-
cruiting coordinator, who also may handle associate development.37 
(b)   Hiring Partners 
 Typically, firms will have a hiring partner or chair of the hiring 
committee who rotates through the position. We found that law firms 
tended to fall into two categories. At some firms, chairs were rela-
tively junior partners, sometimes laterals, who rotate through the 
position for roughly two years. At a slightly larger number of firms, a 
relatively senior lawyer who had developed a kind of specialization in 
recruiting held the position. The mean number of years served 
among the hiring partners we interviewed was 2.88; the median was 
2.5. Many of the senior partners reported having been involved in re-
cruiting on the committee for upwards of ten years. 
(c)   Committee Service as Corporate Governance 
 Law firms view service on the committee as a form of internal or 
self-governance.38 “It’s a way of distributing governance within the 
firm, getting people involved who otherwise would not be. [It] 
[m]akes people feel like they are part of what is going on.”39 Others 
reported that it could be a way for young lawyers or “income part-
ners” to show they are involved in firm governance.40 As one partner 
told us, “I like to use the committee as a forum for larger governance 
issues in the firm; for example, women associates here [and other] 
diversity issues. I believe an organization that has open lines of 
communication is a happier one.”41 
 Firms also seek to involve associates in the recruiting process 
(note that this is not necessarily the same as membership on the hir-
ing committee). In part, this is because of a perception that they are 
younger and closer to the process, having recently gone through it 
themselves. It is also an opportunity for getting involved in firm gov-
                                                                                                                      
 35. Interview 20 (“We strive for a diversity of practice groups, ethnic and gender fac-
tors.”). 
 36. Heinz et al., supra note 12, at 354 (“As the size of the organization increases, for-
mal votes tend to replace informal consensus as the typical governing mode . . . .”). 
 37. See infra Part II.A.3.(a). 
 38. Interview 19 (We don’t have as much trouble getting committee members as in 
other committees. Many “income partners” want to do this to get a notch in their belt, hop-
ing to move to equity partners. It shows they are involved in firm governance. (paraphras-
ing the interviewee)). 
 39. Interview 7. 
 40. Interview 19. 
 41. Interview 28. 
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ernance and improving morale.42 “Associates play an important role 
on the committee. They are happy to be asked. It helps them get in-
volved in the firm’s future. They like the campus visits; it’s almost 
considered a perk.”43 
(d)   Lack of Compensation for Recruiting Activities 
 Firms do not, however, typically take recruiting into account in 
compensation.44 This is so despite substantial time commitments on 
the part of the hiring partners in particular, who are still expected to 
serve clients. We found that the estimated number of hours served on 
hiring committees per year by hiring partners ranged from 200 to 
1200 and was roughly proportional to the number of lawyers in a 
firm. With weekly meetings of the hiring committee, the amount of 
time spent on recruiting is substantial. 
3.   The Intermediaries 
 The above participants are by their nature transient. A successful 
entry-level candidate is a one-shot participant in the market. Simi-
larly, firms rotate the membership of their committees and the iden-
tity of the chair or hiring partner. These persons are practicing law-
yers with obligations like any other partner; hence, they are unable 
to devote full attention to rationalizing the process or following de-
velopments in the market. In many ways, therefore, firms have diffi-
culty maintaining information on the market. Students, too, have 
classes to contend with, to say nothing about relative youth and in-
experience in many cases with the ways of the workplace. To provide 
institutional memory and facilitate the process for the respective in-
terests of firms and students, two sets of intermediaries have arisen. 
(a)   Recruiting Coordinators 
i.   Origins 
 Every firm we interviewed has a professional recruiting coordina-
tor. This profession has emerged as a result of the growth in large 
firms. The position originated in the early 1970s, but it was not 
widespread until later.45 This parallels the general growth of the 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Daniel J. Micciche, Finding the Keepers, AM. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 51, 51 (explain-
ing that associate interviewing builds morale and signals that associate judgments are val-
ued). 
 43. Interview 26. 
 44. Only three of the thirty hiring partners we interviewed reported taking recruiting 
directly into account in the compensation process. Interview 19; Interview 22; Interview 
25. At other firms, it may be considered as part of an intangible or service requirement. 
 45. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, HISTORY, at http://www.nalp.org/ 
about/history.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter HISTORY]. 
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large law firm during this period.46 As the number of candidates for 
practicing in law firms has expanded, a need arose for logistical coor-
dination, and the recruiting coordinators began to develop specialized 
knowledge as well.  
ii.   Function 
 Unlike hiring partners, recruiting coordinators tend to be perma-
nent positions and provide “institutional memory” for the process.47 
Permanence allows the development of a reputation and allows re-
petitive interactions with campus staff to provide the basis for such a 
reputation. Recruiting coordinators become the public face of the firm 
during recruiting. 
 Their function involves the hiring of both entry-level and lateral 
lawyers. They typically will run the summer program, dealing with 
logistics and social events as well as budgeting. They also deal with 
laterals, often brought in by headhunter firms. In addition to recruit-
ing, some recruiting coordinators are responsible for associate devel-
opment, evaluation, and other tasks related to young lawyers. This 
function involves tracking associates during the first few years of 
their legal careers, assigning mentors, running social events, and or-
ganizing evaluation processes.48  
iii.   Gendered Profession 
 The recruiting coordinator profession is nearly entirely female. 
We did not meet a single male recruiting coordinator in our study. 
Typically, the recruiting coordinator was originally a secretary or 
paralegal who evolved into the position as the amount of time re-
quired became more intense during the 1980s and 1990s. Only one 
recruiting coordinator we met had a professional human resources 
background.  
iv.   Status as a Profession 
 New professions seek to bolster their claim to specialized profes-
sional knowledge.49 Recruiting coordinators do this through the de-
velopment of professional associations that allow them to exchange 
information, and many of them attend various meetings sponsored 
by the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), including its 
annual conference. The NALP annual conference features presenta-
                                                                                                                      
 46. See, e.g., Heinz et al., supra note 12, at 345. 
 47. Interview 20; see also Interview 19 (remarking that recruiting coordinators pro-
vide “a wealth of institutional knowledge”). 
 48. One large firm assigned this function to a new partner. Interview 9. The firm ex-
plicitly identified this as indicating the importance they assigned to the task. Id. 
 49. See Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998). 
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tions on subjects such as managing summer programs, diversity, at-
torney retention, public speaking, and effective networking.50 Most 
coordinators reported that the meeting was useful for networking.51 
In addition there are thirty-eight local groups, varying in institu-
tional formality, of recruiting coordinators in various markets.52 Chi-
cago recruiting coordinators have created a local Chicago Association 
of Legal Personnel Administrators (CALPA), which meets monthly.53 
CALPA will bring in outside speakers for workshops on particular 
topics of interest. Recruiting coordinators varied in terms of their 
perceived benefits of CALPA events. Several reported great benefit in 
sharing information on personnel practices, such as the amount of 
vacation time granted to summer associates.54 Others reported at-
tending only occasionally. 
(b)   Career Services Officers 
i.   Origins 
 Finally, law school career services officers form another profes-
sional group with a stake in the process. Career services offices ex-
isted as early as the 1950s, but have seen substantial expansion in 
recent decades as recruiting has expanded in intensity and scale.55 
Career services officers form a network, with a list-serve and re-
gional groupings in large markets, coordinated through NALP.  
ii.   Function 
 Many law schools have recently devoted resources to expanding 
and professionalizing their offices of career services.56 For large law 
firm recruiting they play the crucial function of facilitating the on-
campus interviewing (OCI) process. This involves not just logistics, 
                                                                                                                      
 50. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, 2004 ANNUAL EDUCATION CONFERENCE, at 
http://www.nalp.org/events/2004.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (click on View the Sched-
ule link). 
 51. See, e.g., Interview 24. 
 52. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, CITY GROUPS/CONSORTIA, at http://www. 
nalp.org/about/city1.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). 
 53. CHI. ASS’N OF LEGAL PERSONNEL ADM’RS, ABOUT CALPA, at http://www.calpa. 
info/1024_res/hmpg_frm_hist.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). 
 54. Interview 20; Interview 24; Interview 28. 
 55. See HISTORY, supra note 45; Interview with Lois Casaleggi, Dean of Career Ser-
vices, University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, Ill. (July 11, 2003); Interview with 
Virginia Vermillion, Dean of Academic and Student Administration, former Dean of Career 
Services, University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, Ill. (July 14, 2003); Telephone 
Interview with Jerry Nash, Deputy Director, National Association for Law Placement (July 
17, 2003). 
 56. See, e.g., David Van Zandt, Planning for Career Detours: In a New World Where 
Attorneys No Longer Land at a Firm and Stay Forever, Law Schools Play a Role, NAT’L 
L.J., Apr. 8, 2002, at B13 (describing how Northwestern Law School doubled the staff of its 
career services office and hired two M.B.A.s). 
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but preparing students to be good interviewees, screening resumes to 
ensure they are in a format useful to the firms, and providing infor-
mation on the state of the market.57 They also provide support for 
students engaged in making difficult decisions. In terms of informa-
tion-gathering and provision, they serve to counterbalance profes-
sional recruitment coordinators. 
iii.   Position or Role Within the Law School  
 Offices of career services have become a crucial component of a 
law school as pressures to place students in high-paying law firms 
have increased. The placement rate for students is a component of 
the influential U.S. News & World Report ranking system,58 which 
has significantly modified internal aspects of law school organization. 
One component of this has been greater pressure on schools to devote 
resources to placing students. 
(c)   National Association for Law Placement  
i.   Origins 
 The National Association for Law Placement is the central pro-
fessional organization for those involved in recruiting lawyers. The 
organization was formed in 1971, following an earlier attempt to es-
tablish such an organization in the late 1950s.59 The late 1960s saw a 
rapid increase in law school enrollments and the beginning of large 
scale on-campus recruiting by law firms.60 The organization remained 
somewhat small until the late 1970s when it began to attract law 
firms as members.61 During the rapid expansion of the profession in 
the 1980s, NALP became more institutionalized and moved away 
from a voluntary model, hiring a full time executive director and 
doubling its budget in three years.62 
ii.   Functions 
 NALP’s chief functions are to organize meetings (including a ma-
jor annual conference), educate its members, and compile informa-
tion from annual employment reports submitted by law schools.63 It 
                                                                                                                      
 57. See id. 
 58. Law Rankings, supra note 17. 
 59. See HISTORY, supra note 45 (indicating that there is some evidence that placement 
officers at lower ranked schools pushed the initial attempt in an effort to increase salaries 
and substitute criteria other than academic standing).  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Ken Myers, A Smooth Transition Envisioned for NALP’s Executive Director, NAT’L 
L.J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 4. 
 63. See HISTORY, supra note 45. 
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now publishes a wide variety of information on salaries, employment 
patterns, hiring information, and annual surveys on the fall recruit-
ing process.64 The related NALP Foundation conducts intensive social 
science research into questions of interest to NALP members.65 
NALP also engages in some collective action for law firms, such as 
negotiating group rates with moving companies.66 
 In terms of the recruiting process, NALP’s most important func-
tion is to promulgate the Principles and Standards for Law Place-
ment and Recruitment Activities, which was begun in 1979 and have 
been modified several times since.67 These regulate, among other 
things, the timing of offers and decision deadlines in the hiring proc-
ess.68 Currently 2L students who worked for a firm the previous 
summer must be given until November 1 to respond to an offer of 
permanent employment made before September 15.69 Students not 
employed the previous summer, as well as those who were employed 
but whose offer was issued after September 15, must be given until 
December 1 to respond.70 Those who were employed but who agree to 
hold only one other offer can ask for the December 1 deadline as 
well.71 First-year law students are not to be contacted by Career Ser-
vices until November 1 of their first year, by firms until December 
1.72 These guidelines are technically unenforceable, though our inter-
views did not reveal a perception of widespread violation.73 Indeed, 
the worst violation we heard about was a student who reneged after 
accepting an offer for permanent employment with a firm as a 3L.74 
(d)   High-End Consultants 
 In recent years, a small handful of consultants have emerged who 
focus on various aspects of the recruiting process. Some of these pro-
vide general skills for professional recruiting, such as interviewer 
training to help lawyers get the most out of the twenty minute inter-
                                                                                                                      
 64. NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, NALP RESEARCH, at http://www.nalp.org/nal-
presearch/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004) (listing all research areas). 
 65. See NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC., HOMEPAGE, at http:// 
www.nalpfoundation.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). 
 66. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT & CERTIFIED TRANSP. GROUP, HOUSE-
HOLD GOODS RELOCATION PROGRAM, at http://www.certifiedtransport.com/nalp.htm (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2004) (attributing low moving rate to cooperation with NALP program). 
 67. See HISTORY, supra note 45. 
 68. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR LAW 
PLACEMENT AND RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES, pt. V, at http://www.nalp.org/pands/pands.htm 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. 
 69. Id. at pt. V.C.2. 
 70. Id. at pt. V.C.1. 
 71. Id. at pt. V.C.2. 
 72. Id. at pt. V.D.2. 
 73. Cf. Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun, supra note 16, at 1007 (describing “lawyerly 
changes in strategy” to evade NALP recruitment regulations). 
 74. Interview 24. 
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view.75 Another function for which consultants are perceived to be 
useful is to conduct focus groups for summer associates at the end of 
their term, either to understand what was effective and what was not 
during the summer program, or in cases where students reject the 
firm’s offer, to understand why the student found another firm more 
attractive.76 Some firms consult on how to enhance diversity at 
firms.77 In addition, we identified at least two former hiring partners 
in the Chicago market who charge law firms significant fees to con-
sult on the overall process of recruiting.78  
B.   Process 
 The process by which firms and candidates match for summer as-
sociate positions following the 2L year is lengthy; it begins well be-
fore one actually becomes a permanent associate and contains multi-
ple steps.  
1.   Step 1: The Choice of Schools by Firms 
 The first step is on-campus interviewing, and it begins with firms 
choosing the schools at which they wish to interview. The process be-
gins in February or March of each year when law firms fill out appli-
cations to attend fall recruiting sessions on campuses. Typically 
firms will continue to interview at schools they have gone to in the 
past. Nationally, the median number of schools interviewed at for 
law firms in the category we looked at is 16.5.79 The process of pick-
ing schools changes only slightly year to year at firms. Most firms se-
lect schools by reputation, by past success at the school, and by spe-
cial factors such as alumni partners.80 As one partner told us, “we go 
to forty schools. It’s a function of we’ve been going to forty and it’s 
hard to cut—especially if you have got alums from those schools.”81 
An additional factor is the need for diversity; several firms reported 
recently adding minority schools, such as Howard.82 Firms can also 
                                                                                                                      
 75. An early effort to have consultants actually conduct the initial interviews has not 
seemed to catch on. Ken Myers, Law Firms Wondering Whether Consultants Should Do In-
terviews, NAT’L L.J., July 16, 1990, at 4.  
 76. Interview 9; Interview 14. 
 77. Kristi O’Brien, Committee Hires Consultant to Boost Minority Retention, CHI. 
LAW., July 2002, at 9, 9.  
 78. See, e.g., KANTER PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT, FEES, at http://www.kanterpro-
fessional.com/fees.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (reporting daily fee of $10,000). 
 79. See PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 6. Most Chicago firms decreased the number 
of schools at which they interviewed from Fall 2001 to Fall 2002. Id. at 7. 
 80. See SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 28, at 61-62 (discussing how some firms have ex-
panded the number of schools at which they interview while other firms have reduced their 
recruitment efforts). 
 81. Interview 12. 
 82. Interviewees 5, 17, 22, and 27 reported recruiting at Howard. Howard is ranked 
as a “Tier 3” law school in the 2004 U.S. News & World Report Law Rankings. Law Rank-
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participate in minority job fairs.83 Given the lack of diversity at sen-
ior levels of large firms, “[t]he entry level market helps [firms] recruit 
women and minorities.”84 
 Certain schools develop particular reputations. Most of the law-
yers we talked to felt that it was not worthwhile to interview at Yale, 
since so many Yale graduates end up in academia or government. 
Nonetheless, as with Harvard, more employers interview at Yale 
than there are members of the second year class.85 One factor con-
tributing to firms’ willingness to engage in this interview lottery may 
be the need to signal quality to future clients and competitors, rather 
than simply the prospects of hiring a student. 
 Chicago itself has six law schools, and many elite firms reported 
interviewing at all six, though they were more selective at the lower 
ranked schools.86 One firm reported it liked to recruit at schools like 
Chicago-Kent and Depaul because “nowadays a lot of judges are from 
these schools.”87 In addition, firms vary in terms of their self-
perception as elite or not. Some firms reported a preference for peo-
ple who were at the top of their class at lesser schools, since they 
were perceived to have a chip on their shoulder and would work hard 
once in the firm.88 Firms also recognize that there are many career 
patterns or life circumstances that could lead very smart people to 
                                                                                                                      
ings, supra note 17. Howard reports 200 employers participating in its on-campus pro-
gram. HOWARD UNIV., SCHOOL OF LAW ADMISSIONS CATALOG, http://www.law.howard.edu/ 
info/admissions/pg22catalog.htm (last updated Aug. 6, 2002). Higher ranked American 
University Washington College of Law, in the same metropolitan area, lists 100 on-campus 
employers but is currently ranked 55th in the U.S. News & World Report law rankings. 
Law Rankings, supra note 17; WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW, AM. UNIV., ALPHABETICAL LIST 
OF EMPLOYERS, at http://www.wcl.american.edu/ocs/Docket%20forms/fr2002/list%20of%20 
employers.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). 
 83. Job fairs may be regionally based or targeted at diversity concerns. See, e.g., 
Heather Smith, Bar Talk: Recruiting Comes Out, AM. LAW., Apr. 2003, at 24 (reporting the 
first gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender recruiting job fair). 
 84. Interview 28. 
 85. YALE UNIV., BULLETIN OF YALE UNIVERSITY, Series 99, Number 8, YALE LAW 
SCHOOL 2003-2004, at 128, 148 (Aug. 10, 2003) (reporting that every year approximately 
250 employers register to interview on campus and that there were 196 members of the 
2002 second-year class), http://www.yale.edu/bulletin/pdffiles/law2003.pdf; cf. supra text 
accompanying note 5 (noting the ratio between prospective employers and students inter-
viewing at Harvard Law School). 
 86. The six are the University of Chicago, Northwestern, Chicago-Kent, Loyola, 
Depaul, and John Marshall. There are at least three others in fairly close proximity: Val-
paraiso Law School in Indiana, Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, and our own school 
located two hours away. Wisconsin and Notre Dame are also close. See also Heinz et al., 
supra note 12, at 349 (demonstrating statistically that the share of lawyers from lesser 
ranked schools increased between 1975 and 1995 in large Chicago firms). 
 87. Interview 12. 
 88. See id.; Interview 16. 
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attend a less elite school.89 “Why do we go to these schools? In part to 
generate goodwill in the community. There are also always some 
people there who are very talented and went there either because it 
was a second career or for family reasons, or did poorly as under-
grads.”90 “We go to all the Chicago schools, even though we don’t take 
a student from each of the lesser schools each year. We want to pro-
vide a role model for people. These schools let us prescreen to entice 
us there, but we don’t usually do so.”91 Other firms, however, choose 
not to go to the lower ranked Chicago schools. “In Chicago, we only 
interview at Chicago, Northwestern, and DePaul. The latter has po-
litical clout within the firm, and I didn’t want to have to fight that 
political battle.”92  
 Many firms are willing to expend resources on interviewing on 
campus, even if they are not certain to be ultimately successful. In 
part, this is because they perceive it as fulfilling a marketing func-
tion by signaling the firm’s quality to competitors, future recruits, 
and potential future clients.93 
Many of our summer associates will go on to clerk at the Supreme 
Court or other prestigious clerkships. Even if they don’t work for 
us in the end, they’ll help us hire other Supreme Court clerks. 
We’re also a launching pad for academics, who can help send us 
talent down the road. Our firm has an extended network out 
there.94 
This explains in part why firms do not send lower-cost surrogates to 
conduct interviewing.95 In addition, firms feel that reputational con-
siderations require staying in the entry-level market. When firms are 
banned from recruiting because of scandal or violating school or 
NALP rules, they perceive themselves as suffering a sanction.96 
When Altheimer and Gray, an eighty-eight-year-old Chicago firm 
that ultimately disbanded in June 2003, over-extended offers for 
summer associate positions and realized it could not employ all the 
students, it sought to find alternative jobs for students and paid stu-
dents a significant portion of their summer salaries in a bid to pre-
                                                                                                                      
 89. Cf. Wilkins & Gulati, Black Lawyers, supra note 14, at 551-52 (acknowledging ex-
istence of other factors affecting law school choice, but emphasizing that law firms are not 
inclined to “dig deeper” and, instead, tend to rely on easily observable signs). 
 90. Interview 12. 
 91. Interview 11. 
 92. Interview 19. 
 93. See Wilkins & Gulati, Black Lawyers, supra note 14, at 549; Interview 16. 
 94. Interview 5. 
 95. See Myers, supra note 75 (adding, as another reason, that students value and ex-
pect face to face contact with firms). 
 96. See Ann Davis, Baker & McKenzie AIDS Case Leads to NYU Ban, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 
27, 1995, at A4 (reporting that the New York University School of Law placement commit-
tee barred the New York office of the firm from on-campus interviewing for one year). 
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serve its reputation. For elite law firms, running a typically lavish 
and extensive recruiting program is what releasing a film at Sun-
dance or Cannes is for a major studio: doing so is expected, and not to 
do so would be a major negative signal. 
2.   Step 2: Between School Selection and Interview 
 Once the schools are selected, the firms will contact the career 
services office. The actual process of recruiting varies across 
schools.97 At many highly ranked schools, the firms identify the num-
ber of interview schedules they wish to fill, with each schedule typi-
cally consisting of twenty to thirty interviews of twenty to thirty 
minutes apiece. Most of the students are second-year law students. 
The firms also can identify criteria for students they are willing to 
interview, such as law review membership, class percentile, or grade 
point average. These criteria can be stated either as requirements or 
recommended qualities, and firms vary in the rigidity with which 
they apply their criteria. These criteria also serve as a signal of firm 
quality to a certain extent.  
 At some schools, students then bid on which firms they wish to in-
terview with and the career services office will match the students’ 
bids with the employers. This is done by computer program at many 
schools. At other schools, students submit resumes for the firm to de-
cide whether they wish to interview the student. At these schools, 
the campus career services officers play a facilitative role in gather-
ing and transmitting resumes as well as setting up interviews. 
  At some schools, firms are not allowed to prescreen who they will 
interview.98 Firms must interview individual students even if before, 
during, and after the interview they have no intention of hiring him 
or her. This means that students who do not meet recommended cri-
teria can still try to interview with the firm. Notice that firms have 
the option, if unhappy with the set of resumes on their interview 
schedule, to forgo the schedule entirely and not interview on campus, 
but this does not appear to be common. Some schools, such as Michi-
gan, will not release information on grades prior to the interview.99 
These techniques of withholding information are thought to benefit 
the student body as a whole by allowing students who interview well, 
but who might not meet formal criteria, to benefit. It is arguable that 
the no-prescreen rules also benefit firms by allowing them to signal 
                                                                                                                      
 97. Interview with Virginia Vermillion, Dean of Student Services, former Dean of Ca-
reer Services, University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, Ill. (Aug. 4, 2003). 
 98. Interviewee 26, however, who hires for a large national firm, said that of sixty in-
terviewing locations nationally, most allow the firm to prescreen. 
 99. See UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., RECRUITING AT MICHIGAN 2004-2005, at 7 (2004), 
available at http://www.law.umich.edu/currentstudents/careerservices/recruiting.2004.pdf 
(last visited March 22, 2004). 
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an image of high quality while maintaining more flexibility in prac-
tice (that is, firms can interview and make offers to students who fail 
to measure up to explicitly stated criteria, while presenting a façade 
of greater exclusivity).100 Some firms, however, voiced resentment at 
the no-prescreen rules, arguing that they “hurt everyone.”101 
 Note that the timing of the interview schedules is moving up rap-
idly. Firms reported that up to half the schools are now moving their 
fall interview programs up to late summer, before school begins. This 
may make sense for the schools, which experience less disruption to 
fall classes. In addition, each school may be racing against the others 
to get its candidates to interview with the firms earlier in the hope of 
getting more placed with the large firms. For the law firms, however, 
this is less than ideal. Law firms will have to make decisions on how 
many offers to extend before they are finished with the current 
summer associates. In addition, the marketing function of on-campus 
interviewing to 1Ls cannot be effective when the 1L is still working 
while the 2L candidates are interviewing. Furthermore, student pro-
gramming now may shift up to the second semester of the first year, 
causing further disruption to classes. The fact that interview pro-
grams are moving earlier in time is a point to which we will return in 
Part III. 
3.   Step 3: On-Campus Interviews 
 Once the schedule is set, the firms send teams of interviewers to 
campus. These teams are typically chosen because of school ties and 
who will make a good interviewer, both in terms of gathering infor-
mation and serving as “ambassadors for the firm.”102 Most firms re-
ported sending pairs of interviewers, in part because it allows people 
to see more members of the firm, and also because it saves money 
later, since the largest recruiting expense is the callback interviews, 
which take five to six hours of office time. “Two interviewers will help 
each other to filter out marginal cases and make better decisions. 
                                                                                                                      
 100. We thank Steve Ross for this observation. 
 101. Interview 31. The reasoning is that it does a student no good to expend time and 
psychic energy interviewing with a firm that will not take him or her. Nor, of course, does 
it do a firm any good to expend time and energy interviewing a student who does not meet 
its standards. Note the following comment from Interview 23:  
I had an experience at a good law school that wouldn’t give us the GPA prior to 
the interview even after the list was composed. I perceived them to be saying, 
“If the student is good enough to get into our law school they [sic] are good 
enough to work for you.” I want to make these decisions. It harmed the stu-
dents because it filled a bunch of interview slots with people we wouldn’t take, 
and we then got resumes from qualified folks from the same school who said 
they couldn’t get into our interview list. 
 102. Interview 25. 
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Pairs also protect the firm [from allegations of improper conduct in 
the interview].”103 
 After the students interview on campus, firms must make deci-
sions as to how many and whom to call back to the firm for further 
interviewing. We found substantial variance in terms of centraliza-
tion in how firms made these decisions. Some firms would give each 
interviewing team a target number of offers to make and let them 
exercise discretion.104 At the other extreme, one large national firm 
has its interviewers file immediate reports on the candidates and 
then give a number of callback slots to the Chicago office hiring 
committee on which to make decisions.105 
4.   Step 4: Callback Interviews 
 The callback interview process typically consists of five to six half-
hour interviews with partners followed by lunch with two associates. 
Interviewers fill out report forms on the candidates, which are then 
collected by the recruiting coordinator and distributed to the mem-
bers of the hiring committee. The committee will then review the 
forms. Several firms reported an attempt to make sure one member 
of the hiring committee interviewed each candidate so that there was 
one person with personal knowledge for committee deliberations. The 
hiring committee then makes a decision whether to give the candi-
date a summer offer. In the 2002-2003 Chicago market overall, a 
NALP survey reports that 55.9% of callback interviews lead to an of-
fer, and 31.9% of these are accepted.106 Because successful students 
will have multiple callbacks and offers, the success rate for students 
is higher than these percentages suggest. 
5.   Step 5: Summer Associate Programs 
 The summer itself varies from firm to firm, but the primary pur-
pose is to evaluate the skills and maturity of the candidates.107 Most 
firms do not seek or expect to cover the costs of the program.108 Many 
report being frustrated with the summer programs,109 and firms have 
                                                                                                                      
 103. Interview 8. 
 104. Interview 20. 
 105. Interview 27. 
 106. PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 13; cf. Wilkins & Gulati, Black Lawyers, supra 
note 14, at 548-49; Daphne Eviatar, Bar Talk: Recruiting Roulette, AM. LAW., Aug. 2001, at 
19, 20 (reporting a Silicon Valley law firm’s decision to extend full-time offers to eighty-five 
to ninety-five percent of its 131 summer associates). Note that there is substantial varia-
tion in different regional markets.  
 107. SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 28, at 11. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 19 (“‘[summer programs] are labor intense, high in cost, have an extremely 
high potential for generating bad press, and often yield fewer star recruits than we had 
hoped.’” (quoting an anonymous legal employer)). 
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considered dismantling them, but change is incremental at best.110 
Several firms reportedly are moving away from lavish wine-and-dine 
summer programs toward more intensive work experiences that will 
approximate the actual work of the firm.111 Most notable was the 
Washington, D.C., firm of Howrey Simon Arnold & White that 
adopted the “Howrey Bootcamp” summer associate program in 2000 
that was designed to approximate real working conditions for junior 
associates in the firm.112 Nevertheless, the fun aspect of the summer 
remains. This plays a role not just in marketing to law students, but 
also in building firm morale for existing associates.113 
6.   Step 6: Permanent Associate Offers 
 Following the summer, firms make offers to the successful candi-
dates. The actual dynamics of the offer and acceptance are regulated 
by the NALP guidelines.114 The presumption at most elite firms is 
that students will get an offer. Nationally, offices of over 100 lawyers 
such as those in our study gave offers to 85.5% of their summer asso-
ciates in 2002, and the figure for Chicago was 90.5%.115 Offer rates 
increased with firm size.116 
7.   Conclusion 
 In short, for most entry level candidates joining elite law firms, 
the actual decision to hire takes place roughly two years before the 
person will begin full-time work. This decision is preceded by exten-
sive interviewing of multiple candidates on campus and in the firm 
offices. In addition, many, if not most, of the candidates interviewed 
will have interviews at competitor firms (which, as noted, is one rea-
son why each individual firm must interview so many candidates in 
the first place). The hiring decision is followed by a probationary 
summer and a formal offer and acceptance period. The candidate will 
then join the firm after completing law school. 
                                                                                                                      
 110. Id. at 13. 
 111. See, e.g., Thomas Adcock, Errant Summer Associate Email Is Sign of Changed Job 
Market, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 2003, at 16 (“‘[t]he palatial summer program period has ended’” 
(quoting a hiring partner)). But see SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 28, at 68-71 (reporting that 
social activities and training in a majority of firms remained about the same from 2001 to 
2002). 
 112. Press Release, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP, Howrey Bootcamp Reinvents 
Law Student Recruitment (Aug. 1, 2000), http://www.howrey.com/bootcamp/pr2000-
0801.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). 
 113. Interview 27 (“Most of the benefit of the summer program is for [our] own associ-
ates. It helps them feel like they are part of the firm, and they can have fun.”).  
 114. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. 
 115. PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 10. 
 116. See id. 
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III.   EXPLAINING THE MARKET 
A.   Explaining the Market’s Processes 
[Is the market efficient?] Yes and No. If you were to ask, “Would 
you design this system,” the answer is no. It’s not efficient for stu-
dents, the placement people on campus, or lawyers. On the other 
hand, given a certain structure, it makes sense.117 
1.   The Question of Firm-Level Inefficiencies 
 When one steps back from the process, the defining characteristic 
of the market for large law firm associates is the apparent ineffi-
ciency under which firms operate: hiring law students based upon lit-
tle information, refraining from hiring laterals despite their possess-
ing several attractive attributes, and interviewing a number of can-
didates far in excess of those who will actually be hired. 
(a)   The Puzzle of Hiring Law Students Based on Little Information 
 Large law firms make major hiring decisions on but two semesters 
worth of data on law school experience. That is, they conduct most of 
their hiring that will lead to permanent offers by the fall semester of 
a student’s second year. Why not wait until more information is 
available, either in the third year or after law school? The perception 
among firms is that the best 3Ls have been taken.118 This means any 
individual firm would do better by hiring earlier based on less infor-
mation. This may explain why firms have tolerated the shift in re-
cruiting to the summer after the first year, despite the substantial 
difficulties it places on firms in projecting their staffing needs.119 
 It is puzzling that firms opt to decide whom to hire based on rela-
tively little information, or perhaps more accurately, that a market 
exists which forces firms to decide based on so little information. The 
amount of information from which to make decisions is quite lim-
ited.120 Avery et al. note the shifting makeup of the top five percent of 
                                                                                                                      
 117. Interview 26; see also Interview 29 (“This is the market we’ve been handed. 
There’s little we could do to change it even if we wanted to. Certainly the fact that we get 
to monitor their work in the summer and still say no works for us. There’s a lot of uncer-
tainty though.”). 
 118. Interview 12. 
 119. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 120. In addition to limited information about the candidates, law firms also have lim-
ited information about their own hiring needs. See Eviatar, supra note 106, at 19. Law 
firms operate in a cyclical market and have few tools for projecting what workloads will be 
like in two years time. Id.; see also infra Part III.A.2.(d)ii. The process is perceived by firms 
as imperfect at best. Interview 14 reported: 
The whole system has timing problems. We are hiring people so far in advance; 
markets change in the interim. It is guesswork. And unlike investment banks, 
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students at Harvard Law School after the first year (in terms of 
GPA).121 A firm may have additional benefits to gain from additional 
time beyond mere continued strong grades: a student may be able to 
demonstrate aptitude and interest in particular topical areas, such 
as tax or real estate (by choosing to focus on a particular area rather 
than another, and possibly selecting summer experience to support 
that interest, the student is in effect sending a costly signal about the 
veracity of his or her interests).122 Moreover, when decisions are 
made before the end of the first year there is no way to assess journal 
membership, and when decisions are made prior to the beginning of 
the third year there is no way to assess journal editorial board ser-
vice, moot court performance, or the like. Another author writes in 
the context of judicial clerkships: 
By hiring [clerks in a student’s third semester], judges have access 
to no more than three semesters of grades and to recommendations 
from professors who likely have observed students exclusively in 
large first-year classes. Thus, a professor’s ability to evaluate stu-
dent capabilities is limited. Moreover, a better representation of a 
student’s legal writing ability emerges later in her law school ca-
reer.123 
 Avery et al. dismiss these concerns for law firms because law 
firms “have a large range of types of work” and a “large number of 
associates,”124 but one suspects firms are less nonchalant about 
choosing their future stakeholders and revenue generators. Indeed, 
at the high end of the market, elite law firms are choosing from ex-
actly the same pool of people that judges are.125 Thus, the inefficien-
cies described by Avery et al. for the market for judicial clerkships 
would also apply to the market for lawyers. Avery et al. emphasize 
the use of summer associate positions in minimizing selection er-
ror,126 but this seems like the wrong way to view summer associate-
                                                                                                                      
which will just fire those they’ve over hired, firms are reluctant to do so. It 
would hurt our ability to recruit in the future. 
Other things being equal, firms would prefer to wait until more information was available 
on their own needs and on candidate qualifications. But they do not—or cannot—do so.  
 121. Avery et al., supra note 16, at 801-04 (discussing the tendency of grades and class 
standing to shift between the first and second years of law school). 
 122. Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk Selec-
tion Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 GEO. L.J. 1749, 1791-92 (1995). 
 123. Edward S. Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the Judicial Clerkship Selection 
Process, 59 MD. L. REV. 129, 135 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 124. Avery et al., supra note 16, at 803. 
 125. One interviewee noted that rising debt is making starting salaries at firms more 
competitive relative to clerkships. Interview 8. The interviewee believed that the average 
quality of entry levels to litigation is increasing, as students forgo additional years of 
clerkships to reduce debt loads. Id.  
 126. Avery et al., supra note 16, at 803. 
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ships.127 Summer associate programs’ utility as screening mecha-
nisms is diminished, moreover, by the recreational character they 
typically assume. The more time a summer associate spends on out-
ings to ball games or at wine tastings, the less opportunity a firm has 
to evaluate his or her substantive legal skills (that is, research and 
writing). Accordingly, the summer programs’ marketing objective—to 
brand the firm as fun—runs counter to the summer programs’ other 
goal of obtaining information about candidates.128 In sum: Why do 
law firms hire 2Ls rather than graduating 3Ls? 
(b)   The Puzzle of Aversion Toward Laterals 
 Law firms have to train novices because “virtually all of the skills 
and dispositions that associates need to be good lawyers must be 
learned on the job.”129 This pattern is unusual because comparative 
research suggests that labor markets should be subject to two equi-
libria—one where workers quit infrequently and firms consequently 
train heavily, and a second where workers quit frequently and firms 
consequently train little.130 This is because firms will be reluctant to 
make costly investments in the human capital of their employees 
when the employees can abscond with the investment to the benefit 
of a competitor firm. Law, by contrast, can be considered high-quit, 
high-train.131 As attrition rates increase dramatically, law firms are 
losing many of their initial investments in training associates.132 
 One can envision, as an alternative model, a farm-team system 
where one got experience at a lower-status firm and then interviewed 
at elite law firms. Firms could employ a probationary period to allow 
monitoring. Elite firms would enjoy multiple benefits under such a 
model: the costs of training would be borne elsewhere (by second-tier 
firms), candidates for associateship would be more self-selected and 
mature (no leaving law to pursue poetry), and there would be a far 
better empirical track record on which to make hiring decisions. Fi-
nally, firms would dispense with all the costs, noted above, of having 
to administer summer associate programs, train lawyers who leave 
                                                                                                                      
 127. One interviewee reported that the ability to reject candidates after monitoring 
their work was helpful, but acknowledged a lot of uncertainty in the process. Interview 29. 
 128. See supra note 113 (describing the process as fun for current associates). 
 129. Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving, supra note 14, at 1608. 
 130. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evi-
dence, 113 Q.J. ECON. 79, 114 (1998) (“[I]n terms of our model, we can think of the United 
States at a low training and high quit equilibrium and Germany at a low quit, high train-
ing equilibrium.”). But see Alison L. Booth & Gylfi Zoega, Do Quits Cause Under-Training?, 
51 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 374, 383 (1999) (explaining that high quit, high training is also 
a possible equilibrium). 
 131. See Booth & Zoega, supra note 130, at 383. 
 132. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
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the firm, and hire lawyers based on minimal information. An esti-
mate of the monetary cost is as follows: 
Overall, the summer program isn’t that expensive. It costs [the 
firm] $40,000 to $50,000 per summer. But that’s small. Even a sin-
gle bad hire costs [the firm] $150,000 by the time you figure it out 
and give them some notice. . . . [F]ourteen years ago it took 1.5 
years to get rid of a bad hire.133 
 The farm-team model is not merely a theoretical construct. In-
deed, such a model appears to operate for such high-status legal em-
ployers as the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices134 and the ACLU, which hire on 
an “as-needed” basis.135 In sum: Why do law firms take on the expense 
of hiring law students at all?136 
(c)   The Puzzle of Redundancy and Selection Costs 
 The current market for law firm associates is highly redundant. 
First, as noted above, each firm subjects each candidate to multiple 
interviews before extending an offer.137 Aside from this intrafirm re-
dundancy, there is considerable interfirm redundancy as well. Firms 
compete intensely for a limited pool of top students, resulting in mul-
tiple interviews and offers for these students. For example, at New 
York University School of Law last fall,  
a total of 13,357 interviews [were] conducted by 330 employers—
from large multipractice firms to elite specialty boutiques to fed-
eral, state, and local government agencies. It all add[ed] up to 
13,357 individual chances to make or break a career, spread 
among 387 2Ls and 88 3Ls.138 
Many of the firms we interviewed reported difficulty in securing time 
from partners to conduct callback interviews.139 In general, larger 
firms have lower acceptance rates after callback interviews, since 
                                                                                                                      
 133. Interview 27. 
 134. Personal conversations between a senior assistant U.S. attorney and one of the 
authors, stating his office tends to hire those with prior prosecutorial experience. 
 135. See Dimitra Kessenides, Hot Jobs 2001: The Smokin’est, Hippest, Nowest, Chicest 
Jobs of the Year, JD JUNGLE, Sept. 2001, at 56, 63, available at http://www.jdjungle.com/ 
main.cfm?chid=0&schid=0&WT=00&inc=inc_article.cfm&artid=50101&pg=8&template=4 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
 136. Technically, law firms hire summer associates. But typically, summer associate-
ships lead to full-time associate positions upon graduation. In essence, then, law firms 
conduct their hiring for full-time associate positions by hiring law students. 
 137. See supra Part II.B.3-4.  
 138. Jannot, supra note 1, at 51; see also Micciche, supra note 42, at 51 (reporting that 
firms call back at least twice the number of summer associate offers); sources cited supra 
note 106. Note that Harvard Law School reported an average of fourteen interviews per 
student in Fall 2002. Interview 3. 
 139. See, e.g., Interview 21. 
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they are competing with each other over the same group of students 
who then receive multiple offers.140 
The process as a whole, distinct merely from on-campus in-
terviewing, also consists of high expense and redundancy:  
The process involves a lot of firms chasing the same people.141 
Giving 100 offers means 600 hours of callback interviews, plus my 
time and that of the committees and interviews. Altogether 2000 
man-hours, which is hundreds of thousands of dollars a year.142 
245 interviews, 116 office callback offers, 74 actual callbacks, 22 
offers, 6 acceptances for the summer program.143 
Each year we see 250-300 at OCI, have 50-60 callbacks; half of 
those get offers; half of them accept. In the end we have about 6-9 
summer associates.144 
This year we conducted 448 interviews. We also got 3000 unsolic-
ited entry-level resumes. Sometimes these were from schools we 
don’t go to, like BYU, and sometimes they are from schools we do 
go to but [are from] students who didn’t make our interview list. 
We call back about one-third of the interviewees, or 152; 121 of 
those accepted our invitation to callback. Sixty percent of them got 
offers, and twenty-one percent accepted to come for the 2L sum-
mer. Last year we made 68 total offers for a class of 15 2Ls. We 
usually offer around seventy percent, and twenty-five percent or so 
take it.145 
Each year we make offers to hire 90-100 summer associates. We 
have to make about three offers for every one of those, but it varies 
by market. If you think about it, we are seeing fifteen people for 
every offer we make.146 
Nationally, the firm conducts 2600 OCI interviews, 800 from the 
Chicago office alone. They have 220 callbacks and will make 170 
offers. In NY, by contrast, there are many more interviews, 
roughly 1000 with 650 callbacks, but fewer than 170 offers.147 
 The ratios vary from market to market. Yields are lower too. In 
Chicago it is about thirty-two percent, in New York it is about 
twenty-five percent.148 In sum: Why do firms engage in hiring proc-
esses that involve such uncertainty? 
                                                                                                                      
 140. See PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 14. 
 141. Interview 21. 
 142. Interview 14. 
 143. Interview 17. 
 144. Interview 25. 
 145. Interview 19. 
 146. Interview 26. 
 147. Interview 8. 
 148. PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 13.  
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(d)   Interaction Between Inefficiences 
 The sources of uncertainty we have identified interact with each 
other. Because law firms hire when candidates have so little tangi-
ble, relevant information to provide, firms must spend more time in 
interviews to gather information. Because firms tend not to hire lat-
eral associates, they must internalize the costs of training. Because 
training is so expensive, law firms have additional incentive to spend 
much effort trying to gather what information is available through 
the interview process. And because firms can never be sure how 
many candidates will accept offers, each firm must interview more 
people than would otherwise be the case.  
2. Firm-Level Inefficiency as Response to Market-Imposed 
Uncertainty 
(a)   Decentralized Matching Markets and Unraveling 
 The short answer to the questions posed—why firms make deci-
sions based on limited information, why they also absorb the costs of 
training novice associates, and why the market is highly redun-
dant—is that they operate within a decentralized matching market.  
i.   Decentralized Matching Markets 
 A decentralized matching market occurs when each agent makes 
his or her own decisions independently of decisions taken by other 
agents. It is to be contrasted with a centralized matching market, 
wherein participants agree to bind themselves to a protocol that as-
signs matches. The classic example is the National Resident Match-
ing Program (NRMP). Begun in 1949 by the Association of American 
Medical Colleges and the American Hospital Association,149 
it was proposed, and ultimately agreed, that a more centralized 
matching procedure should be tried . . . . Under this procedure, 
students and hospitals would continue to make contact and ex-
change information as before. (It is worth noting in this regard 
that the complete job description offered by a hospital program in 
a given year was customarily specified in advance . . . . Thus the 
responsibilities, salary, etc., associated with a given internship . . . 
were not a subject of negotiation with individual candidates.) Stu-
dents would then rank in order of preference the hospital pro-
grams to which they had applied, hospitals would similarly rank 
their applicants, and all parties would submit these rankings to a 
central bureau, which would use this information to arrange a 
                                                                                                                      
 149. See Roth, Evolution, supra note 16, at 995-97. 
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matching of students to hospitals and inform the parties of the re-
sult.150 
 The program began in response to a severe shortage of candi-
dates.151 The NRMP “was instituted at a point in time when there 
were almost twice as many internship positions as there were gradu-
ates of U.S. medical schools to fill them.”152 One student of central-
ized matching dubs this “[t]he driving force behind the medical [cen-
tralized matching] model.”153 While the algorithm first used was 
changed in 1953, its successor and the National Resident Matching 
Program remain in use today.154  
 This type of coordinated matching mechanism is referred to as 
centralized matching. The feasibility of transporting it to legal 
matching markets has been explored and advocated before with re-
spect to selection of federal law clerks,155 the subgroup of clerks who 
wish to be eligible for United States Supreme Court clerkships,156 and 
law review articles.157 Additionally, entry-level lawyers seeking arti-
cling positions in some Canadian markets are assigned by a central 
matching system.158 Some have been more skeptical of the virtues of 
centralized matching for allocating clerkships than others.159 Never-
theless, given that the costs detailed above are shown below to be di-
rectly linked to its decentralization, it remains an open question why 
the market has yet to centralize. 
ii.   Unraveling 
 The key characteristic about decentralized matching markets is 
they tend to unravel. The simple way to describe unraveling is that if 
Firm 2 recruits at T2, then Firm 1 has an incentive to recruit at T1 in 
order to prevent Firm 2 from forming contracts with the most desir-
able candidates. Naturally, though, Firm 2 then has exactly the same 
incentive to recruit at T0 in order to stymie Firm 1. This dynamic 
process, with each firm recruiting earlier and earlier than its com-
petitors, is termed unraveling.160 
                                                                                                                      
 150. Id. at 995-96 (footnote omitted). 
 151. Id. at 1005. 
 152. Clark, supra note 122, at 1754 (footnote omitted). 
 153. Adams, supra note 123, at 167. 
 154. Roth, Evolution, supra note 16, at 997. 
 155. Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152 (1990). 
 156. Avery et al., supra note 16, at 797. 
 157. Stephen R. Heifetz, Efficient Matching: Reforming the Market for Law Review Ar-
ticles, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 629 (1997). 
 158. See infra Part III.B.1. For information on Toronto, see Law Society of Upper Can-
ada, at http://education.lsuc.on.ca/ess/apo/apoRecruitment.jsp (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
 159. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 122; Adams, supra note 123. 
 160. Priest has argued that the use of the term unraveling has a normative bias be-
cause it suggests there is an a priori point at which decisions should be made, when in fact 
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 Unraveling seems to be a natural consequence of decentralized 
matching markets. Before the institution of a centralized system in 
the form of the National Resident Matching Program, medical in-
ternships were allocated at the beginning of the student’s third year, 
and occasionally at the end of his or her second year.161 Similarly, un-
til structural reform last year, the market for federal judicial law 
clerks presented “judges [with] an incentive to ‘jump the gun,’ hiring 
slightly earlier than their competitors, to get the pick of the candi-
dates.”162 As a result, federal judges developed a Law Clerk Hiring 
Plan to regulate the timing of offers.163 Additional examples of unrav-
eling within decentralized matching markets include “postseason col-
lege football bowls . . . fraternity and sorority rush [from which the 
term rush is derived]” and undergraduate early admissions pro-
grams.164 
 The causal logic is clear, and it is supported by empirical data of 
similar phenomena in similar markets: decentralized markets un-
ravel. The race to get relatively scarce top-level talent forces firms to 
recruit law students before they graduate. Over time, this dynamic of 
firms racing against each other has forced firms to seek to hire stu-
dents earlier and earlier, so that they are now doing so relatively 
early in a student’s law school career. Because unraveling pushes 
firms to make hiring decisions early, so as not to have the best can-
didates stolen by competitors, firms make these decisions on rela-
tively little information. Firms cope as best they can by running 
summer programs to function as a screening device, but the efficacy 
of this device is open to question.165 
                                                                                                                      
optimal decisions by definition are made when the marginal cost of obtaining new informa-
tion is greater than the marginal benefit. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for 
Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching Markets, 32-35, draft of Sept. 8, 2003 (on 
file with authors). This point is very well-taken, but we retain the use of the term unravel-
ing to capture the progressive movement toward earlier and earlier hiring over time. 
Priest’s account does not really address this phenomenon. We do not observe matching 
markets unraveling to later points in time as the relative marginal cost-and-benefit calcu-
lus changes.  
 161. See Roth, Evolution, supra note 16, at 994. 
 162. Avery et al., supra note 16, at 795. 
 163. See CHIEF JUDGE EDWARD R. BECKER & JUDGE HARRY T. EDWARDS, (Co-Chairs of 
the Ad Hoc Committee), U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT, THE 2004 LAW 
CLERK HIRING PLAN: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ 
Lawclerk/FAQs/faqs.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
 164. Avery et al., supra note 16, at 845; see also Interview 14 (comparing the interview 
process to sorority or fraternity rush). 
 165. Cf. supra notes 127 and 133. 
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(b)  Decentralized Matching, Unraveling, and the Hiring of Law 
Students 
 Decentralized matching and unraveling help explain why law 
firms hire law students. The history of the market for entry-level 
lawyers suggests that the market has indeed unraveled to its present 
equilibrium. NALP guidelines limiting the timing of offers originated 
in the early 1970s and were modified after pressure from law firms 
in 1992, moving deadlines for replying to offers a month earlier.166 At 
the time, elite schools resisted the requirements by boycotting the 
new deadlines, but in the end the schools relented.167 
 At the same time, schools are competing against each other to 
place their students in top jobs. Some schools, such as Harvard, have 
resisted racing against other schools in their on-campus interview 
programs,168 but at the lower end of the market, schools seek to force 
employers to come to campus earlier so as to fill their summer inter-
view slots with the schools’ students. Currently, many firms report 
that schools are moving the interview process up to the summer after 
the first year of grades. This exacerbates the information problems in 
the market. Although presumably grade information is still the 
same, there may be less information available on a student’s 2L 
courseload, law review membership, and extracurricular activities. 
Even more significantly for the firms, it means that they must now 
make offers for 2L summer associateships before they have made de-
cisions on the current year’s class. This increases the risk that a firm 
can end up with too few offers, or even worse, too many.169 The uncer-
tainties produced by unraveling are pronounced. 
 For a variety of reasons, unraveling does not appear likely to be 
pushed up before the first year of law school for the market as a 
whole. First-year courses provide a common denominator by which to 
sort candidates.170 One might imagine the unraveling proceeding to 
the spring of the 1L year, which would base job offers on a single se-
mester of grades. But the common metric of law school would lose its 
                                                                                                                      
 166. Ken Myers, Revised Recruiting Guidelines May Bring Chaos This Autumn, NAT’L 
L.J., May 17, 1993, at 4; see also Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun, supra note 16, at 1007. 
 167. Myers, supra note 166. 
 168. Interview 3. 
 169. To illustrate, suppose the firm of Dewey, Cheathem & Howe believes it will be 
able to hire ten lawyers per year. It hires twelve summer associates in one year based on 
its projected workload two years ahead. In mid-summer it believes that eleven of these are 
likely to succeed and it estimates that ten out of the eleven will accept the firm’s offer. 
Based on these estimates, it makes twelve offers for the following year’s summer class be-
fore the November 1 deadline. On November 1, four of the last year’s summer class inform 
the firm they are going to work in other cities for spousal reasons. Even if all twelve offers 
for the next summer are accepted and are ultimately hired, the firm will not be able to 
meet its goal.  
 170. “The first year is nice because it is standard. [Students] are taking core courses, 
no courses we can’t identify as nonrigorous. You can’t pussyfoot con law.” Interview 19. 
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sorting function completely were unraveling to move the market up, 
for instance, to the time when LSAT scores are available. 
 Firms cope with having to interview young law students early in 
law school as best they can. They conduct several interviews for each 
candidate, often involving more than one interviewer. Summer pro-
grams offer firms the chance to screen candidates, and these appear 
to focus on eliminating the occasional undesirable candidate, since 
most summer associates receive offers of permanent employment. 
Still, additional interviews carry the downside of diminishing mar-
ginal utility, and summer associate programs, as noted, have their 
own limitations. It is impossible to surmount entirely the informa-
tional deficit imposed by unraveling. 
(c)  Decentralized Matching, Uncertainty, and Risk-Aversion Toward 
Laterals171 
 In many respects, the pool of lateral associates should be a 
sought-after source of talent for law firms. Laterals do not require 
the same training as new associates. They are self-selected, both to 
the firm and to the profession as a whole (they have chosen to remain 
lawyers rather than become poets). There is a greater track record of 
real-world accomplishment, thus providing a correspondingly better 
prediction of performance. Moreover, one would have the entirety of 
one’s law school career—all three years—upon which to judge a can-
didate. Furthermore, those recruited by informal social ties with a 
given firm’s members might be better suited to that firm’s culture. 
Indeed, our research revealed at least one Chicago firm that em-
braces a lateral-hiring policy, and another that has seriously consid-
ered the possibility. Yet very few firms rely on a lateral-only strat-
egy.172 
 Unraveling plays a big role in understanding why firms prefer en-
try-levels to lateral associates as the primary source of recruiting. In 
many ways, the market for lateral associates represents the fabled 
“Market for ‘Lemons.’”173 George Akerlof famously argued that the 
market for used cars contained a higher proportion of bad cars be-
cause of the difficulty for the buyer to evaluate quality.174 The quality 
of the associate is in many ways private (or asymmetric) information 
                                                                                                                      
 171. Our discussion of laterals is restricted to lateral associates. There appears to be a 
vigorous market in lateral partners, who are not subject to many of the perceptions we dis-
cuss in this Section. 
 172. A NALP survey showed 25 out of 454 respondent employers (almost all were law 
firms) hired only laterals in 2002. PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 10. The report does not 
break out these firms by size. 
 173. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970). 
 174. Id. at 489-90, 495. 
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that cannot be easily communicated or signaled. For example, ac-
cording to Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, “If the associate 
tries to leave her current firm after not being promoted to partner, 
any other potential employer receives an obvious signal about the as-
sociate’s abilities.”175 This belief seems to have a good number of ad-
herents: 
The good people stay where they are. So keeping in the entry level 
market is crucial though we do hire laterals and post-clerkship en-
try levels.176 
Laterals, meaning those with 2+ years of experience, have greater 
attrition. Think about it, they have demonstrated less loyalty al-
ready. But we do hire them to fill needs.177 
Laterals can be naïve regarding the market and their expectations. 
Also, sometimes there are perfectly good reasons to change jobs, 
but just as often there are some issues.178 
There is a kind of stigma attached: “Didn’t make it at their own 
place.”179 
Laterals don’t stay.180 
 A comment ought to be added to Gilson and Mnookin’s statement: 
The perceived signal obtains irrespective of the associate’s actual 
abilities. A more descriptively accurate statement may be that, ce-
teris paribus, a lateral carries greater risk than a new associate, or 
put differently, the pool of lateral associates contains a greater pro-
portion of lemons than does the pool of fresh law students. 
 Just as “good cars may be driven out of the market by the lem-
ons,”181 so too may good lateral associates be driven out of the market 
by bad laterals.182 Furthermore, as noted above, firms that are uncer-
tain of a candidate’s quality, or lack thereof, may be deterred from 
hiring him or her, not out of fear that he or she is a lemon, but sim-
ply because they do not wish to overpay (the winner’s curse).183 Some 
aversion toward laterals stems from the lack of transparency of legal 
                                                                                                                      
 175. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 18, at 577.  
 176. Interview 5. 
 177. Interview 8. 
 178. Interview 21. 
 179. Interview 16. 
 180. Interview 28. 
 181. Akerlof, supra note 173, at 490.  
 182. Note that this is not the case for laterals who have a plausible explanation for 
leaving; for example, when their firm collapses. See, e.g., Chris O’Brien & Margaret Steen, 
Area Lawyers in Demand, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2003, at 1C (focusing on 
rapid re-employment of partners after firm collapse, but remarking that many of the asso-
ciates will not remain unemployed for long), http://www.bayarea.com/mld/siliconvalley/ 
business/columnists/gmsv/5152045.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
 183. We thank Larry Ribstein for that insight. 
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work and not from the structure of the market. But the decentralized 
matching market exacerbates the aversion, because it takes a 
norm—matching with a firm as a 2L—and increases the strength of 
the negative signal emitted by failure to follow that norm. 
 Furthermore, because good lateral associates are so hard to find, 
it may be all the more important for a firm to find good entry-level 
associates. The difficulties of evaluating laterals helps explain why 
firms have an incentive to hire law students at all; in other words, 
the market has unraveled to that point.184 Firms deal with the uncer-
tainty of the lateral pool and, more generally, of gaining information 
about the quality of lawyers by creating their own monitoring system 
of homegrown associates.185 As a result, the top firms have to incur 
training costs that they might not otherwise have to if they could 
simply agree to hire only candidates with one or two years of experi-
ence. This feature might explain why candidates with clerkships are 
desirable for firms—clerkships not only constitute an independent 
signal of quality, but also provide a year or two of training from 
which the firm can benefit by paying only a bonus. 
(d)   Decentralization, Lack of Coordination, and Redundancy 
 The third effect of uncertainty is redundancy. Decentralization 
leads to redundancy in two ways. First (as noted above), because the 
consequent unraveling pushes hiring decisions back so early, firms 
must invest greater resources into choosing each individual candi-
date.186 Second, because each firm in a decentralized market by defi-
nition operates independently, no one firm can be certain how many 
candidates will accept its offers, and how many candidates will ac-
cept competitors’ offers. This second form of redundancy (inter—
rather than intra—firm) is the subject of Part III.A.2.(d). Firms and 
candidates undertake many more interviews than ought to be neces-
sary, in part because the market is decentralized. A decentralized 
market unravels, leading to too little information at the time of hir-
ing and the need to undertake multiple redundant interviews with 
candidates who have substantially similar records. 
i.   Transaction Cost Asymmetry 
 In large part, the redundancy reflects asymmetric transaction 
(search) costs. It is more costly for a firm to interview a candidate 
                                                                                                                      
 184. See Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun, supra note 16, at 1037 (describing the effects 
of unraveling and evaluation difficulty in the context of firms hiring senior associates from 
their competitors). 
 185. We thank Michael Vogel for this insight, which accords well with traditional tour-
nament theory. See, e.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 18. 
 186. See supra Parts III.A.1.(c), III.A.2.(a)i. 
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than it is for a candidate to interview with a firm. First, assuming an 
initial interview is on-campus, the firm must pay for travel time, the 
time spent interviewing the candidate, and some proportion of the 
time spent interviewing candidates who are not extended callbacks. 
Second, the firm must pay for the additional callback interviews and, 
again, some proportion of the callbacks expended on candidates not 
granted offers. The same applies at the summer associate level—the 
firm pays not only for each summer associate who becomes perma-
nent, but also for some proportion of summer associates who fail to 
be up to par. As noted in Parts II.A.2.(a) and III.A.1.(c), there are 
also considerable logistical infrastructure and personnel costs that 
must be maintained. Recruiting for an elite law firm is a major en-
deavor and an expensive one as well. 
 For candidates, the costs are far less. On-campus interviews, 
which are de rigeur at elite law schools, take place but yards from 
where a student normally spends his or her days. Unless the student 
has an outside job, time spent interviewing, while potentially stress-
ful and not always successful in terms of getting an offer, fails to im-
pose significant opportunity costs; the student is not forgoing income 
to interview with the firm, although firm interviewers have to forgo 
billable hours to travel to, interview, and assess students. Moreover, 
while callbacks perhaps present the same drawbacks as on-campus 
interviews, they also occasionally represent the chance to travel to 
exciting metropolises on a decent expense account. Finally, the sum-
mer associate program is often plush and carries substantial bene-
fits: it pays well, provides first-hand knowledge of a particular firm 
and what it is like to work at a firm in general, and carries the possi-
bility of a permanent offer. 
 Additionally, students have the benefits of being able to external-
ize some of their transaction costs onto career services offices. It is 
career services offices that do much interacting with firms. In terms 
of search costs, they schedule on-campus interviewing, search for op-
portunities, and so forth. In terms of bargaining costs and enforce-
ment, they can lobby for individual students and provide social sanc-
tions in the case of firm defection. Generally speaking, their ability to 
plug into an information network of both other career services offices 
and alumni at target firms yields benefits across the board in terms 
of search, bargaining, and enforcement. Perhaps most important, due 
in part to such factors as the U.S. News & World Report law school 
rankings (of which the percentage of students employed a certain 
amount of time after graduation is a component),187 law schools do 
not resent having to perform this function. Rather, they eagerly con-
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sider it in their interest to assist students in finding employment be-
cause it serves to maintain or enhance their rankings. 
 Because of the asymmetry in transaction costs and the net down-
side potential disutility of not getting a summer associate position, 
students over-interview.188 In other decentralized matching markets, 
there would be a ready-solution for this: the exploding offer.189 The 
exploding offer is a compensatory device for the uncertainty created 
by decentralized matching markets. It allows actors to know, instan-
taneously, precisely how many more matches they must make before 
their individual requirements are met. A judge who has one clerk-
ship open and makes an exploding offer to a candidate, which is then 
accepted, knows that he can cease his recruiting at that point.190 
 NALP prohibits exploding offers during the on-campus interview-
ing process,191 and this rule seems to be followed. Why this is so is not 
entirely clear. This may reflect a relatively strong bargaining posi-
tion for law students vis-à-vis firms, especially for elite law students. 
Furthermore, there are far more law firms, even elite firms, than 
there are elite law schools. In other words, both law schools and law 
students may have numbers on their side when dealing with law 
firms. Alvin Roth has speculated that some of the dynamics of decen-
tralized matching may reflect imbalances in supply and demand, al-
though he has failed to articulate this hypothesis fully.192 
 In any event, whatever its causes, the effect of a ban on exploding 
offers is to create greater uncertainty for firms with respect to staff-
ing. Firms cannot make offers, have them accepted or rejected imme-
diately, and then adapt their strategy until their staffing needs are 
met. Instead, they must extend offers to a wide range of candidates, 
not knowing for some time how many (or who) will accept. 
 Finally, as a sidenote, it is interesting to compare the transaction 
costs in the market for elite law firm associates versus those in the 
market for federal law clerks. In the federal law clerk market, in 
which unraveling is still a problem, the asymmetries are far less se-
vere. In contrast to on-campus interviewing, where firms come to a 
student’s metaphorical doorstep, participation in the federal law 
clerk market is a major logistical undertaking for the candidate. Stu-
                                                                                                                      
 188. Heifetz, supra note 157 (making the same argument in the context of law review 
articles). For authors, there is practically zero marginal cost to sending additional law re-
view articles once the article itself has been written. See id. at 634. For law reviews, 
though, there is substantial cost to read and assess each article. See id. at 635. Thus the 
market tends toward inefficiency. Id. at 629. 
 189. See, e.g., id. at 637 (describing exploding offers in the law review article selection 
context); Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun, supra note 16, at 1001-02 (using the example of a 
judicial clerkship exploding offer). 
 190. See Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun, supra note 16, at 1001-02. 
 191. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 68, at pt. IV.F. 
 192. See Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun, supra note 16, at 1037. 
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dents have to assemble individualized packets of information, speci-
fying each to a judge’s particular preferences. That information can 
be difficult and expensive (even merely in terms of long-distance 
charges) to transmit. Moreover, as noted, students bear the cost of 
travel. Finally, bargaining and enforcement are far more costly. 
There is no NALP for federal judges. We certainly would never sug-
gest that Judge Posner would practice some of the strong-arm tech-
niques he and his co-authors describe judges engaging in, but if he or 
someone of his stature did, it would take a most intrepid law school 
dean (let alone a dean or director of career services) to challenge him. 
ii.   Decentralized Matching, Prediction, and Redundancy 
 Even if asymmetric transaction costs may explain much of the re-
dundancy in recruiting, there may be more to the story. A plausible 
case can be made that redundant recruiting processes are, at least in 
part, the result of the decentralized nature of the matching market. 
Because firms are not guaranteed 100% yield in a decentralized 
matching market, they must instead rely on predictions. The prob-
lem with predictions, of course, is that they are probabilistic and may 
turn out to be wrong. Firms cannot know with certainty how many 
offers will be accepted. Nor do they know how their competitors will 
hire in the coming year. The past may be a poor guide to the future. 
The prospect of hiring too few associates is not attractive. Being un-
derstaffed represents lost revenue in the short-term and, in the long-
term, undermines the viability of the partnership by depriving the 
firm of homegrown leadership. Alternatives to the on-campus inter-
view track are slim. The firm can hire 3Ls, but they have a higher 
probability of being lemons. Interviewing as 3Ls perhaps is due to 
inability to have a permanent offer already, or at least a permanent 
offer they wish to accept, neither of which represents a particularly 
good signal. The firm can hire laterals, but they also present poten-
tial lemon problems and the winner’s curse problems.193  
 The solution, then, is to over-hire. Because firms must rely on 
predictions that may be wrong, there is a bias toward safety margins 
and worst-cases. Here planned attrition comes into play again. As the 
firm develops more information over time, it can prune its ranks to 
optimal size. Moreover, there is an affinity here between unraveling 
and redundancy: because much recruiting takes place so long before 
actual permanent employment will begin, there is some flexibility in 
adapting the workforce to adjust to staffing needs. 
 It may also be possible to look at the first few years of associate-
ship as a screening period. Because the pre-permanent offer screen-
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ing process is so deficient in providing information about particular 
candidates, firms tend to utilize the initial associate years for screen-
ing to an extent not generally recognized. This would accord well 
with the phenomenon of planned attrition that some interviewees 
mentioned. It also intersects with one of the major themes in the 
study of the economics of the large law firm, that of “the tourna-
ment.”194 Considerable attention has been devoted to the significance 
of how and why some associates make partner and others leave the 
firm.195 The prevailing account is that the firm conducts a “tourna-
ment,” a competition in which associates are pitted against each 
other in a Darwinian contest, partnerships being awarded to those 
who win.196 A more recent challenge has been that the tournament is 
more variegated, that the firm quickly sorts out who will make part-
ner from those who will not.197 
 The explanation elaborated in this Article complements and modi-
fies somewhat this more recent account (which is itself an extension 
and modification of the tournament model). This account, elaborated 
by Wilkins and Gulati, holds that law firms can (and do) hire new as-
sociates despite knowing virtually nothing about them in part be-
cause associates are sought largely for their credentials as status 
symbols, and also because much of the work that many associates 
perform is not particularly taxing. We would emphasize the role of 
necessity: law firms hire based on little information not neccesarily 
because doing so is optimal or desirable, but rather, because the 
market structure and the unraveling it creates leave them no choice. 
iii.   Additional Perspectives on Redundancy 
 Others have argued elsewhere that decentralized matching mar-
kets exhibit redundancy, although they have disagreed about 
whether to adopt centralized matching as a curative.198 Annette E. 
Clark takes issue with centralized matching as an answer to redun-
dancy.199 In large part, she argues that eliminating exploding offers 
creates problems for judges, who must deal with uncertainty regard-
                                                                                                                      
 194. See, e.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 18 (arguing that the growth of the large 
law firm is attributable to the “promotion-to-partner tournament”); Wilkins & Gulati, 
Reconceiving, supra note 14 (critiquing traditional tournament theory). 
 195. See, e.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 18; Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving, su-
pra note 14. 
 196. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 18, at 100-02. 
 197. Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving, supra note 14. 
 198. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 123, at 132-35, 162-67 (describing the judicial clerk-
ship process and potential effects of imposing a centralized system); Heifetz, supra note 
157, at 635-37, 659-68 (discussing redundancy and centralization in law review article se-
lection process). 
 199. Clark, supra note 122, at 1766-70. 
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ing staffing.200 However, Clark’s argument transfers poorly to the 
domain of the market for law firm associates (as opposed to law 
clerks). Law firms already are prohibited from giving exploding of-
fers, and this prohibition seems not terribly prone to violation. If ex-
ploding offers have already been eliminated, then there seems little 
to lose by shifting to centralized matching. At a minimum, it seems 
hard to argue that there will be an increase in uncertainty. 
 Whether or not centralization of the entire market is feasible, our 
interviews with the largest national firms show that they seek to ob-
tain some of the benefits of centralization within the firm by elimi-
nating redundancy and inter-office competition. As one national firm 
hiring partner said: 
We have a centralized process. The interviewers go to the campus 
and give us reports on each candidate within twenty-four hours. I 
sort it and send it to our offices. There’s a narrow window. On any 
day in the fall you may see two to three schools. We have devel-
oped special software to help us manage the process. We have 200 
people doing the interviewing. They scan the resumes and tran-
scripts and send them along with the report. We then let the of-
fices know what callbacks are “approved.” This centralization 
helps make the cut more consistent. The offices then make the fi-
nal call on whom to callback. The reports on the callbacks and the 
office recommendations are then compiled by the committee, which 
makes the offer decisions by vote. Many decisions are easy. We 
spend most of our time discussing the marginal cases. 
 . . . . 
 . . . We think centralization works for our firm. If the process is 
decentralized, the offices are competing with each other for talent. 
I’ve seen situations where one office of a firm hosts a reception at a 
school the same night another office hosts a reception. Our mes-
sage is that we are recruiting for the firm. Also if we left [the of-
fices] to their own devices, different hiring partners would have 
different standards and different pools . . . and we wouldn’t get the 
benefit of the cross-pollination [sic] or the consistency.201 
(e)   Conclusion 
 In short, much firm activity in the market is puzzling: firms hire 
students, who are not yet lawyers, on the basis of little information; 
firms pass up lateral associates who are ready-trained, self-selected 
sources of talent; and they spend a great deal of time interviewing 
far more people than they will hire, many of whom will receive a 
similar offer from a competing firm. But much of this becomes under-
standable once one recognizes that the market for elite law firm as-
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sociates is decentralized and prone to unraveling: firms have to hire 
earlier lest a competitor snatch up the best candidates; firms have an 
incentive to pass up those who do not participate in the 2L matching 
market; and firms face considerable uncertainty in projecting and 
filling staffing requirements, which in turn may cause them to err on 
the side of caution and interview broadly. 
B.   Explaining the Market’s Structure 
 Given the costs inflicted upon firms by the market’s uncertainties, 
and the risk-averse strategies these uncertainties necessitate, it is 
reasonable to ask why the elite legal profession has not centralized 
its matching like the medical profession. Antitrust law does not seem 
to present an impenetrable barrier and would likely allow it depend-
ing on whether it is seen to have an educational rationale.202 In Part 
III.B.1, first we examine a relevant case of centralized matching, that 
for Canadian lawyers, which came into being but has devolved of 
late. Then, in III.B.2, we speculate on some tenable hypotheses as to 
why the American market for elite law firm associates has remained 
decentralized. 
1.   Explaining Centralized Matching in Practice: Canada 
 The Canadian experience with centralized matching suggests that 
it is at least a theoretical possibility in the market for entry-level 
lawyers. In Canada, law graduates undertake a one year articling 
period of practical training before formal entry into the profession.203 
At the upper end of the market, these typically lead to permanent of-
fers of employment for the entrants.204 In three large markets for 
lawyers, those in Vancouver, Calgary, and Toronto, these articling 
positions were assigned through the use of a centralized clearing-
house.205 These were administered by a private company.206 
                                                                                                                      
 202. There was an antitrust challenge to the system of medical matching in 2002 that 
has not yet been successful in gaining class certification. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 
No. 1:02-cv-00873-PLF-JM, slip op. (D.D.C. filed June 2002). The residents claimed that 
the matching program caused them to be paid less than their fair market value because 
each resident was matched with only one hospital, preventing bidding for wages and vio-
lating section one of the Sherman Act that prohibits “every contract, combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.” Barry F. Rosen, Commentary: On Health Care-
The Antitrust Attack on the National Resident Matching Program, DAILY REC. (Balt., Md.), 
July 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 10167596. The legality of the matching program will 
ultimately depend on whether it is considered a restraint of trade or in fact may help to 
improve market conditions. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918). 
 203. Roth & Xing, Jumping the Gun, supra note 16, at 1024. 
 204. Id. 
 205. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 16, at 2. 
 206. See NAT’L MATCHING SERV., INC., GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT MATCHING PRO-
GRAMS, at http://www.natmatch.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
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 This program was designed to eliminate many of the uncertainties 
identified above.207 The matching program was seen to alleviate “the 
time pressures on both students and firms in the scheduling and 
completion of interviews, in the mutual evaluation process, and in 
the making and acceptance or rejection of offers.”208 It also eliminated 
strategic behavior on the part of both students and firms.209 For 
firms, matching has the additional benefit of allowing firms “to spec-
ify the maximum number of students required,” eliminating the 
problem created when a firm extends too many offers and receives 
too many acceptances.210 
 The scale of Canada’s centralized matching experiment may have 
been facilitated by limitations on mobility among provinces.211 Al-
though technically a graduate of a Canadian law school can complete 
the requirements for entry into the profession in any jurisdiction, 
there have historically been practical limitations on the process.212 
 Interestingly, Canada’s system of recruitment has come under in-
creasing pressure during the last few years, and there has been 
structural change in the market that has made it more like the 
United States market. One such change was the development of na-
tional law firms following the 1989 case of Black v. Law Society of 
Alberta, which eliminated provincial law society rules that required 
all firm partners to be members of the local bar.213 The conclusion of 
a national mobility agreement214 has led to the completion of a na-
tional market in legal services, so that most provinces will now rec-
ognize the credentials of lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions. A 
second change was the boom in the legal services market in the 
United States, which led many New York firms to begin recruiting in 
Canada.215 As a result of these expansions in the market, the inter-
viewing process that had formerly taken place in February of the 
second year moved up to the fall of the second year. Thus, Canada 
has seen some unraveling in its market for entry-level lawyers. 
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 As the process has unraveled, professional intermediaries have 
arisen as in the United States. Around 1997, Canadian law schools 
began to employ career development officers, and an association of 
these officers developed, which now has thirteen member schools.216 
As recruitment pressures have intensified, two of the markets that 
used a centralized matching system have abandoned them: Vancou-
ver eliminated its system in 1996 and Toronto in 2002.217 This proc-
ess was encouraged by an increasing number of students and firms 
concluding agreements outside the centralized process. 
 The Canadian story suggests that centralization is a theoretical 
possibility, but that pressures in the marketplace prevent it from be-
ing adopted or utilized over the long term. The Canadian legal pro-
fession was unable to sustain centralized matching of its new mem-
bers over time. This would seem to parallel the experience of the 
American legal profession (or at least its elite segment), which was 
unable to centralize matching despite many of the same problems 
that have afflicted other matching markets, including the similar 
medical profession around a half century ago. The next Section de-
scribes the features of the industrial organization of the legal profes-
sion that explain these divergent outcomes. 
2. Explaining Decentralized Matching in Theory: The United 
States 
 No clear-cut answers present themselves as to why the American 
market for elite law firm associates has failed to centralize, or why 
the Canadian market seems to be decentralizing, but some tenable 
hypotheses include the capital structure of the industry, corporate 
governance, reputational structure, and the degree of concentration 
(or lack thereof) in the industry. This Section considers these various 
hypotheses, beginning with a comparison between law and another 
professional services industry, that for medical services.  
(a)  A Comparison Between Law Firms and Hospitals: Capital 
Structure 
 Law firms need “a certain core infrastructure: a law library, com-
puterized research networks, a full-time docket clerk, a filing staff, 
modern copying equipment, and a word processing director.”218 Other 
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than this relatively limited amount of physical capital, though, many 
scholars recognize “the central importance of human capital” in the 
structure of the law firm.219  
When you come down to it, what is a law firm other than selling 
high ticket services to clients. We have two assets: our people and 
our clients. . . . I can’t imagine cooperation with our competitors on 
hiring. We pay attention to them in terms of numbers, attrition 
rates, acceptance rates, and where we are losing talent to.220 
Thus, the National Resident Matching Program might tolerate ten to 
fifteen percent of students being pressured to make “informal com-
mitments”—to defect—prior to match,221 but this may not be accept-
able to law firms. 
i.   Hard Assets 
 Medicine, unlike law, requires equipment. With perhaps the ex-
ception of a few specialties like psychiatry, even the humblest practi-
tioner today requires laboratory service and devices beyond a mere 
stethoscope. Moving slightly up the continuum of sophistication, 
what characterizes specialists is often not their minds but their ma-
chines. Cardiologists and allergists, not to mention surgeons, could 
not work out of their own home. In other words, hospitals comprise 
both physical plants and equipment, neither of which possesses com-
parable importance in the legal profession.222 “[T]ypically 20 to 30 
percent of a hospital’s total operating expenses” consist of “supply 
chain dollars.”223 In a phrase, health care is “capital-intensive.”224 
ii.   Soft Assets – People 
 Hospitals also require a greater number of nondoctors than law 
firms require nonlawyers. In 2000, there were 84,867 full-time 
equivalent medical and dental residents in U.S. registered hospi-
tals.225 This compares to a total of 4,454,107 other personnel in U.S. 
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registered hospitals, including: 97,931 doctors and dentists, 
1,039,994 registered nurses, 151,684 licensed practical nurses, and 
3,164,498 other salaried personnel.226 
 By contrast, Altman Weil’s 2000 Survey of Law Firm Economics 
found that firms with over 150 lawyers had an average of 54 secre-
tarial staff per 100 lawyers, 9 technology staff per 100 lawyers, 9 fi-
nance/accounting staff per 100 lawyers, and 36 paralegals per 100 
lawyers.227 The point is that while the number of nurses and other 
salaried personnel in registered hospitals far exceeds the number of 
doctors, the number of nonlawyer staff in firms of over 150 lawyers is 
about the same as the number of lawyers. This implies that the law-
yer is far more important to the survival of the law firm than the 
resident (or doctor) is to the survival of the hospital. Accordingly, it is 
relatively easy to understand why a hospital is far more likely to en-
trust its intake of personnel to a mechanical process, while law firms 
might be far less sanguine. 
iii.   Soft Assets – Methodologies 
 Medicine may also be more amenable to being broken down into a 
set of processes: “hospital performance can be benchmarked.”228 Resi-
dents are expected to know the proper diagnosis and protocols for a 
patient presenting a given set of symptoms. The contrast with the le-
gal profession, which really cannot be deconstructed into a series of 
rote procedures and metrics, particularly in a field like litigation 
where each case is fact-intensive, is striking. These processes may 
compensate and alleviate for the need to get good people. Rather, 
medicine seems more like management consulting at a firm like 
McKinsey and Company, at which “[h]undreds of new MBAs join the 
firm every year, and almost as many leave. But the company is able 
to crank out high-quality work year after year because its core capa-
bilities are rooted in its processes and values rather than in its re-
sources.”229 
iv.   Conclusion: Different Goods, Different Services 
 Law firms have different assets and provide different services 
than hospitals. Law firms often provide deliverables composed of 
compressed intellectual content (for example, an appellate brief); 
hospitals often provide the less abstract service of round-the-clock 
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care in a suitable environment with an appropriate team (for exam-
ple, an overnight stay for observation).  
(b)  A Comparison Between Law Firms and Hospitals: Corporate 
Governance Structure 
 The corporate governance structure of law firms and hospitals 
also differs. Law firms often, if not usually, make hiring decisions by 
partners. Partners, in turn, have both a financial and reputational 
stake in ensuring the long-term viability of the partnership and its 
maintenance by new associates who will one day inherit it. Once 
more, hospitals are far less dependent on the residents who are 
matched. 
 Every entry-level lawyer is a potential future partner, a stake-
holder in the firm itself. Again, the medical profession yields a useful 
counterpoint: a residency director picks a future co-worker. But a hir-
ing partner picks a potential future co-owner, one who may directly 
or indirectly influence the appreciation or depreciation of that hiring 
partner’s personal financial and reputational equity over years to 
come. That hospitals can be not-for-profit, while law firms are not, 
only enhances the relative disparity between recruiting associates 
and recruiting residents. 
 Because most law firms are partnerships, individual lawyers are 
particularly dependent on the quality of other lawyers in the firm. 
Each other partner in the firm contributes directly to the income of 
the lawyer in a way that senior doctors at the same hospital do not. 
Law firms also have a collective reputation; indeed, some have ar-
gued that the structure of the large firm itself is based on the need 
for a collective reputation.230 By establishing a multigenerational 
reputation, large law firms offer quality assurance to clients.231 
 Large law firms are aware that their income depends on multi-
generational practices. As one hiring partner told us, “one way to 
build a firm history and a firm culture that passes on from genera-
tion to generation is by having lawyers who grow up in the firm.”232 
Good lawyers are “institutional memories for their clients.”233 The 
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need to maintain the firm over time means that senior lawyers have 
an especially strong incentive to hire talented entry levels.  
We know there will be attrition and can’t tell who will stay, but we 
don’t take anyone who we don’t think can’t make partner.234 
We aren’t interviewing for potential partners explicitly—it’s too far 
away in time to grasp. But a successful associate will become a 
successful partner, so in that sense we are looking for the same 
things. The attributes are good communication, a willingness to 
work. We assume that all those who come in the door have the in-
tellectual ability to do the work.235 
 The need to replicate the firm by hiring future partners raises the 
stakes in recruiting, thus making cooperation via centralized match-
ing more difficult and more unlikely. 
(c)   Professional Services Firms, Law Firms, and Reputation 
 As professional services firms, law firms have a strong need to 
signal quality to their clientele and the in-house corporate counsel, 
who “consider[s] the quality of law firms closely . . . through pub-
lished rankings of practice area experience, review articles in the na-
tional law journals, the J.D. degrees of the firm’s attorneys, and qual-
ity rating handbooks.”236 Some have argued the corporate counsel 
then uses the status of the firm she chooses to insulate her own deci-
sion-making from reproach should things turn out poorly.237 On an 
anecdotal level, one notes that large law firms typically post the bi-
ographies of all their attorneys online. A firm fearing that it would 
garner a lesser crop of associates via centralized matching, either 
due to cheating or otherwise, might be reticent to participate: the 
need to use those associates as a way to signal quality is too great. 
 Furthermore, law firms understand that the recruiting process 
can play an important role in signaling quality to potential clients, 
competitors, and future employees.238 For two managers at one major 
firm, “the essential theme underlying both the marketing and re-
cruiting functions—how to promote the firm—is the same; only the 
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audience is different.”239 Being known for recruiting only at selective 
schools, or for extending only a limited number of offers and receiv-
ing a high number of acceptances, or for not having to recruit at all240 
may signal high status. 
Even if you go interview at a school and get no one, you do project 
an image and help get future laterals, clients. At least this is what 
our in-house recruiting professionals tell us.241 
Admittedly the OCI process takes a lot of time but we get other 
benefits from it. We get our name out there. The people we talk to 
and don’t bring back will end up working at other firms or [for] po-
tential clients.242 
It’s true the process seems wasteful. We spend a lot of time inter-
viewing those we don’t take. But it gives the firm visibility among 
lawyers—an intangible benefit. How would the marketplace per-
ceive a lack of a summer program?243 
 Finally, it should also be noted that for professional service firms 
alternative means of marketing, besides conveying quality through 
recruiting, may be limited. “[M]any people are not accustomed to see-
ing professional service advertising.”244 Furthermore, limitations on 
lawyer advertising remain in place, even though an absolute ban is 
no longer constitutional.245 Accordingly, recruiting functions as a 
relatively cheap substitute for the questionable practice of direct ad-
vertising. Professional service firms have few fixed, or hard, tangible 
assets. Thus the comparative value of soft assets like ‘“brand eq-
uity’—a hidden asset for the company that generally goes unrecorded 
on its balance sheet”—may be greater.246 In sum, any activity with 
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recruiting potential or implications—such as decentralized match-
ing—may take on additional importance. 
(d)   Fragmentation and Collective Action 
 One reason that Canadian markets for lawyers were able to cen-
tralize while those in the United States have not may lie simply in 
the fact that Canada is smaller, which may have facilitated coordina-
tion and collective action. Moreover, the Canadian matching system 
was regionally divided and regulated, in a way the United States le-
gal profession is not. While local practice restrictions prevent lawyers 
from one jurisdiction from practicing nationally in the United States, 
these do not pose a barrier to elite law school graduates, who are re-
cruited nationally.  
 Thus, one reason why the market for elite law firm associates has 
not centralized may be collective action, of which centralized match-
ing is a form. The United States legal profession is highly frag-
mented.247 Accordingly, firms may fear defection and cheating by ri-
vals; or the relatively fragmented nature of the legal services market 
makes trust more difficult; or lock-in to a new standard turns out to 
be disadvantageous; or some combination thereof. Additionally, it is 
possible that the firms most needed for centralized matching to 
evolve—the ones with the highest status—are the ones with the least 
incentive to participate. These may well explain some of the puzzle. 
At the same time, there seems to be no reason why these concerns 
were not equally present in the (highly fragmented) market for medi-
cal residents, or for Canadian associates.  
3.   Conclusion 
 Centralized matching has been tried before, in the market for new 
lawyers in Canada. It may currently be dissolving there. Still, given 
the problems decentralized matching has caused firms, detailed in 
Part III.A, and given that there are not legal barriers to centralized 
matching, it makes sense to question why centralized matching has 
not arisen in the United States market for elite law firm associates. 
While there does not seem to be a simple or readily-accessible answer 
to the question, it seems tenable to suggest the causes may be: the 
importance of associates to law firms (in terms of their ability to gen-
erate revenue and to perpetuate the organization as a whole), the 
(perceived) benefits of decentralized recruiting for signaling reputa-
tion and quality, the difficulties of collective action in a fragmented 
industry, or some combination thereof. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article concludes by summarizing our findings and speculat-
ing how the empirical data relates to literature on the large law firm 
and on matching markets in other contexts.  
A.   Understanding Market Structure and Process 
 This Article has described a market, the market for elite law firm 
associates, that contains a broad set of actors and a fairly rigid and 
elaborate set of processes. We argue these processes are consistent 
with risk-aversion in response to uncertainty imposed by market 
structure. The actors include not only those who will work with one 
another—the current students or future associates and hiring part-
ners—but also professional recruiting coordinators and professional 
career services staff. The latter pair provide institutional memory 
and information-sharing functions and have legitimate claims to pro-
fessional knowledge, or “jurisdiction” in Andrew Abbott’s terminol-
ogy.248  
 The process begins, usually, with on-campus interviewing in the 
fall of a student’s second-year of law school. At the top end of the 
market, students bid on interview slots and employers have no op-
tion but to interview students who select them; that is, the inter-
views are not prescreened. Based on the interviews, students are se-
lected for callbacks, usually consisting of multiple interviews, after 
which a firm will use some procedure to determine whether to extend 
an offer for summer employment to the student. If the student ac-
cepts an offer, he or she will become a summer associate, after which 
he or she will probably, but not always, be made an offer to become 
an associate after graduation. 
 What is striking about the process is, first, its cost and uncer-
tainty. Firms hire their primary source of human capital and future 
stakeholders after but a year of law school. In other words, there is 
little basis on which to evaluate candidates. Even if one knows how 
they did in tough courses such as Constitutional Law, or whether 
they made law review, firms could benefit by waiting to learn how 
the students performed in other difficult courses such as Federal 
Courts, or whether they became editor-in-chief of the law review, or 
finished first in moot court. Selecting so early in law school deprives 
firms of considerable information when making an important choice. 
 Second, selecting new associates from law school at all may be 
unwise for firms. Since “virtually all of the skills and dispositions 
that associates need to be good lawyers must be learned on the 
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job,”249 ceteris paribus, it would make the most sense to hire new as-
sociates laterally. This would benefit law firms in two ways. First, 
they would have a greater empirical track record on which to judge 
prospective associates: all of law school and the more dispositive 
post-law school career. Second, they would externalize post-law 
school training costs onto another firm; in other words, firms would 
be able to engage in free-riding. 
 Third, there is a considerable degree of redundancy across the 
market. This is a consequence of what NALP terms the “central dy-
namic[]” of the legal market: “A large number of employers [compet-
ing] fiercely for a small portion of the student pool.”250 Firms expend 
a great deal of time and energy doing the same tasks, with regard to 
the same candidate, when that candidate will in the end become a 
full-time associate at but one firm and a summer associate at but two 
at most. 
 Much of this uncertainty is caused by the fact that legal recruiting 
takes place in a decentralized matching market. Decentralized mar-
kets unravel, and that is what has happened: firms hire law stu-
dents, and they hire law students early in law school. Furthermore, 
firms may be more inclined to shy away from laterals because the 
market operates to designate anyone looking for a job, as a 3L or 
thereafter, as bearing a higher likelihood of being a lemon. This ad-
verse selection problem only increases the pressure to hire law stu-
dents and to hire them early. Additionally, decentralized matching 
markets exacerbate the redundancy already present in the law firm 
associate selection process. Because firms cannot be certain of their 
competitors’ recruiting strategies, to say nothing of their own pre-
ferred candidates’ ultimate decisions, they must engage in a certain 
degree of risk-averse behavior, one sensible strategy being to inter-
view and hire broadly. And finally, because avoiding lemons takes on 
such importance, not only must firms interview many candidates, 
they must interview each of those many candidates many times. 
 We conjecture that the reason the market for elite law firm asso-
ciates has remained decentralized is because of industrial organiza-
tion. The large law firm, as a partnership, consists almost exclusively 
of the lawyers who work for it and must signal its quality to a variety 
of audiences, including a sophisticated clientele. Each of these fac-
tors—the importance of human capital, the corporate governance 
structure of the firm, and the need to signal quality—renders associ-
ate selection extremely important. Taken together, along with a 
fragmented industry comprised of many players, these factors may go 
a long way toward explaining why the elite sector of the legal profes-
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sion has failed to centralize its recruiting function along the lines of 
medicine.  
 If we are correct, scholars prescribing centralized matching as a 
curative for market failure may be naïve. Market inefficiencies from 
decentralized matching do not simply imply that cooperation ought 
to prevent such inefficiencies. Rather, they suggest market structure 
and industrial organization have impeded cooperation in the first 
place. Accordingly, one ought not to expect or prescribe centralized 
matching in markets whose industrial organization precludes it. 
Structure is, if not outcome determinative, highly influential in de-
termining process.  
B.   Theoretical Relevance 
1.   The Tournament 
 We begin with Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay’s “tournament 
theory.”251 For Galanter and Palay, a lawyer will have human capital 
obtained prior to and during law school, but they acknowledge that 
one is still “a ‘kid’ just out of law school.”252 Because such a lawyer 
has a great deal of important work to accomplish but it is difficult for 
the firm to monitor associates to ensure goals are achieved, a tour-
nament is erected by the firm: “By promoting some but not all of the 
associates [to partner] the firm communicates to them that it will 
reward productivity but not shirking; therefore, the associate will ex-
ert a maximum effort to win the contest.”253  
 While still the dominant paradigm, Galanter and Palay’s account 
of the large law firm has been subjected to substantial criticism.254 
We do not refute their account, but suggest an alternative way of 
thinking about what appears to be a tournament. Much of the ap-
pearance of a tournament may stem from the difficulty of predicting 
a lawyer’s fit prior to his or her beginning with the firm. Some of this 
is inevitable given the difficulty and uncertainty of interviewing and 
screening, and it is exacerbated by the disjunction between law 
school and law practice. That said, decentralized matching exacer-
bates the difficulty of prediction: firms race each other for talent and 
make decisions on limited information, forcing them to make more 
matches, and with a higher probability of each match in fact being a 
mismatch. As more information becomes available in the early years 
of an associate’s career, the mismatches reveal themselves. Firms do 
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not choose to structure a tournament; rather, the attrition model of 
the current large law firm may in part be forced upon them by the 
market in which they participate, and this model merely simulates 
the appearance of a tournament. Moreover, this logic applies bilater-
ally to associates as well, who often have to make major decisions 
early in their lives, let alone their law school or professional careers. 
Finally, optimal strategies can shift as situations, information, and 
information-processing patterns all change: associates may be per-
petually in a Bayesian updating mode, assessing all available options 
in light of all other available options.255 
2.   The Seeded Tournament 
 The best rejoinder to Galanter and Palay, and heretofore the best 
treatment of elite law firm recruiting, is the work of David Wilkins 
and G. Mitu Gulati. Their work is actually contained in a pair of arti-
cles: one a direct rebuttal to Galanter and Palay,256 the other possess-
ing many of the same themes but seeking to explain the absence of 
black lawyers in elite law firms.257 For Wilkins and Gulati, “firms are 
under pressure . . . to reduce the amount of money that they have to 
spend on recruiting, training, and monitoring without endangering 
either quality or competitiveness.”258 Firms achieve this through 
“high wages, a steep pyramidal structure in which all lawyers com-
pete in a series of tournaments . . . and an informal tracking system 
that separates associates who will be trained from those who will 
not.”259 
 Wilkins and Gulati’s argument is multifaceted, as are the ways in 
which it relates to our own. We must take issue with their conclusion 
that elite law firms “do not carefully screen entering associates in 
terms of their goals, motivations, or levels of risk aversion.”260 On the 
contrary, law firms have erected institutional structures, in the way 
of hiring committees and professional recruiting staff, to do just that. 
They have also instituted hiring procedures, from how committees 
are to be staffed, to how committee members are to be compensated, 
to how candidates are to be evaluated and approved. To state that 
law firms do not carefully screen seems somewhat conclusory.  
 Also, we did not find much evidence that “firms are under pres-
sure to find ways to reduce the amount of money that they have to 
spend on recruiting, training, and monitoring without endangering 
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either quality or competitiveness.”261 Firms seem, if not indifferent to 
the amount they must spend to recruit effectively, then resigned; it is 
accepted as part of the cost of doing business that being an elite law 
firm, and recruiting accordingly, means having a professional re-
cruiting coordinator, having a hiring partner who spends consider-
able billable time on committee work, administering a summer asso-
ciate program, and so forth.  
 With respect to race, we do not engage with the conclusion that 
there may be hidden racism by which seemingly race-neutral stan-
dards as “personality and fit” serve to disqualify black candidates.262 
Nor can we comment on the possibility that “grades and law review 
membership count less for blacks than they do for whites.”263 All of 
these phenomena may be present. Our research does suggest that 
some elite firms strongly desire minority or diversity representation 
among their entering associate classes.264 For example, several firms 
interviewed recruit at Howard University,265 ranked a Tier 3 law 
school by U.S. News & World Report.266 This would seem to indicate 
that Chicago-area firms are making a good-faith effort to recruit 
black candidates and would seem to conform to Wilkins and Gulati’s 
acknowledgement that “the institutional racism story . . . is at best 
incomplete.”267 
 Probably most importantly, Wilkins and Gulati argue that law 
firms sort almost immediately those associates who will make part-
ner from those who will not.268 Given the large sums of money it costs 
to recruit a single new associate, this would seem to make little 
sense. Several interviewees stated that they recruit for future part-
ners.269 This is not unavoidably inconsistent with Wilkins and Gu-
lati’s assertion of dual associate tracks. Still, if firms are able to de-
termine almost immediately who can make partner, it is puzzling 
why firms exert so much time and money recruiting so many they 
know will be profitable for so little time, and a partner for no time at 
all.270 If the stellar associate is “careful, well organized, [attuned] to 
detail, and [equipped with] a high boredom threshold,”271 this does 
not seem to be what elite law firms (claim to) seek. They seek fit, 
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which is sometimes equated with passion and would seem to equate 
poorly with high boredom thresholds.  
3.   Matching 
 As described above in Part III.A.2.(a), Alvin Roth has put forth a 
great deal of literature on two-sided matching markets. However, 
much of his emphasis has been on explaining the longevity rather 
than the evolution of centralized matching.272 Similarly, he uses case 
study methodology, and he fails to compare markets that have cen-
tralized with those that have not (in other words, he selects on the 
dependent variable).273 This Article makes an implicit comparison be-
tween a profession that has centralized—medicine—and one that has 
not—law. Roth’s argument as to the origins of centralized matching 
markets is that certain decentralized matching markets suffered 
from various pathologies, then centralized, and from this sequence 
one can infer causation.274  
 This Article presents a case that poses a critical challenge to such 
logic and a skeptical challenge to the prescriptions (centralized 
matching) that flow from such logic. The market for elite law firm as-
sociates is a decentralized matching market that suffers from the ap-
parent inefficiencies that afflict such markets. In fact, it suffers from 
these apparent inefficiencies in spite of a relatively powerful market 
coordinating body (NALP). Nevertheless, despite the existence of 
centralized matching in the same market across the border (the legal 
market in Canada), or the existence of centralized matching in a 
similar market in the same country (the market for medical residents 
in the United States), the presence of these apparent inefficiencies 
has not led to centralized matching. There does not seem to be a lin-
ear relationship between alleged market pathologies stemming from 
decentralized matching and the eventual adoption (be it by prescrip-
tion or organic evolution) of centralized matching. 
 Rather, Part III.B suggests that the adoption of centralized 
matching seems contingent upon a conducive industrial organization. 
Because of this industrial organization, firms must expend resources 
chasing the same few candidates in a redundant process, based on a 
fraction of potentially available information, and then take upon 
themselves the cost of training those candidates.  
 It is important to recognize that centralized matching represents 
a form of collective action, or cooperation amongst competitors. Thus, 
matching is most likely to arise and function where it matters least. 
                                                                                                                      
 272. See, e.g., Roth, New Physicians, supra note 16. Roth does address this question 
more recently with McKinney and Niederle. See MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 16. 
 273. See, e.g., Roth, Evolution, supra note 16. 
 274. Id. at 992. 
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That is, matching functions best in medicine because the residents it 
assigns there are comparatively fungible and unimportant. In the 
domain of the legal profession, however, new associates take on rela-
tively greater importance and, accordingly, cooperation is far harder 
to achieve.275 Matching may never evolve (as in the United States) or 
evolve but break down (as in Canada). Centralized matching, in turn, 
emerges as not cause but consequence: some industrial organizations 
are more conducive toward the collective action required for match-
ing than others. 
 Our argument parallels a recent paper by George Priest, who ar-
gues that the institution of matching where terms of trade are lim-
ited only further frustrates free market function, with ill-effects.276 
Both Priest and ourselves are skeptical regarding centralized match-
ing. The foundations of our skepticism differ, though: Priest is skep-
tical because he considers centralized matching to be another limita-
tion on already constricted terms of trade. By contrast, we are skepti-
cal about the creation and sustenance of cooperation and coordina-
tion among a fragmented group of market players, when their focus 
is on something of great value: the elite law firm associate.277 
 
                                                                                                                      
 275. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 229. 
 276. Priest, supra note 160, at 44-45. 
 277. For a similar argument on a different topic, see Charles Lipson, International Co-
operation in Economic and Security Affairs, 37 WORLD POL. 1, 12-18 (1984) (arguing that 
international cooperation in security affairs is more limited than in economic affairs be-
cause the stakes are more in the former than the latter).  
